Marlo Lewis

Is the science debate on global warming “over”? Politicians, pundits, and academics never tire of repeating “the debate is over” mantra. They could not be more wrong.

As I explain today on MasterResource.Org, all the basic science issues in the global warming debate–attribution, sensitivity, and even detection–are unsettled and more so now than at any time in the past decade.

For those who want to delve more deeply into these and other fascinating issues, check out the marvelous Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC) report, Climate Change Reconsidered, authored by Drs. Craig Idso and Fred Singer with 35 contributors and reviewers. On a wide range of issues (nine main topics and 60 sub-topics), the NIPCC report demonstrates that the scientific literature allows, and even favors, reasonable alternative assessments to those presented by the U.N. IPCC, the self-anointed scientific “consensus.”

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may require corporations to assess and disclose the impacts of global warming and climate change policy on their bottom lines, today’s Climate Wire (subscription required) reports. The story indicates that Commissioner Elisse Walter is the key proponent inside the SEC. The big outside push–no surprise–comes from Ceres, the eco-sustainability investment network. Wisconsin insurance regulator Sean Dilweg and Maryland Treasurer Nancy Kopp are also cited as leading advocates of SEC-mandated “climate risk disclosure.”

Climate Wire rightly notes that, “The move would drive the government deeper into the climate debate, potentially reshaping management decisions at companies across the country.”

The prospect of SEC-required disclosure of climate risk scares the bejesus out of fossil energy producers and energy-intensive manufacturers, Climate Wire indicates:

Big emitters like oil and gas companies, for example, might have to formally reveal the output of their greenhouse gases and the disadvantages they face from federal efforts to charge polluters for every ton of carbon that’s released.

Even more, the revelations could spark financial fallout. Institutional investment groups with trillions of dollars in assets could use the disclosures as the basis for withdrawing money from companies they consider unprepared for rising risk related to regulation and climatic convulsions.

In reality, there is little risk to company bottom lines from climate change per se. Even if one makes the questionable assumption, for example, that global warming will measurably intensify tropical storms over the next few decades, climate risk will always exceed climate change risk by a wide margin. For instance, due to completely natural climatic factors, a company in Florida has a much greater vulnerability to hurricane strikes and damages than a company in Ohio, regardless of how climate changes. Yet this does not stop people and businesses from moving to Florida, enjoying good weather most of the time, and building a prosperous society.

No, the really serious climate risks are policy-related. For example, the application of Clean Air Act permitting rules to stationary sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions–the inescapable consequence of EPA establishing greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards for new motor vehicles in response to the Supreme Court’s April 2007 Massachusetts v. EPA decision–would potentially expose 1.2 million previously unregulated firms to new controls, paperwork, penalties, and litigation.

Moreover, the endangerment finding prerequisite to EPA adoption of GHG controls for motor vehicles could also compel the agency to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for GHG-related “air pollution.” Logically, NAAQS for GHGs would have to be set below current atmospheric levels and, thus, could not be attained even if EPA shut down every car, power plant, and factory in the United States.

Once the regulatory cascade starts, climate policy risk to the U.S. economy could function as a gigantic, permanent, Anti-Stimulus Package. For the gory details, see my comment on EPA’s Endangerment Proposal, especially pp. 33-48.

It’s not enough for Ceres and other eco-zealots to clobber big emitters and industrial energy consumers with costly regulation. They also want those companies to scare away investors in advance of climate regulation via public disclosure of the potential burdens.

However, the Ceres strategy could backfire. If the SEC adopts the Ceres plan, targeted corporations should use the mandated information to publicize the destructive impacts of climate regulations on jobs, growth, investment, and shareholder value. Such information would reveal that the risks of climate policy vastly outweigh the risks of climate change. It could and should fuel a broad-based political backlash against the self-anointed saviors of Planet Earth.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may require corporations to assess and report the impacts of global warming and climate change policy on their bottom lines, today’s Greenwire (subscription required) reports. The story indicates that Commissioner Elisse Walter is a key proponent inside the agency. The big outside push–no surprise–comes from Ceres, eco-sustainability investment network. Wisconsin insurance regulatory Sean Dilweg and Maryland Treasurer Nancy Kopp are also mentioned as leading advocates of SEC-mandated “climate risk disclosure.”

Greenwire rightly notes that, “The move would drive the government deeper into the climate debate, potentially reshaping management decisions at companies across the country.”

Greenwire indicates that the SEC, stung by criticism that its lax regulation contributed to the financial crisis, now views an assertive stance on climate risk as a way to shore up its image.

The prospect of SEC-required disclosure of climate risk scares the bejesus out of fossil energy producers and energy-intensive manufacturers, Greenwire says:

Big emitters like oil and gas companies, for example, might have to formally reveal the output of their greenhouse gases and the disadvantages they face from federal efforts to charge polluters for every ton of carbon that’s released.

Even more, the revelations could spark financial fallout. Institutional investment groups with trillions of dollars in assets could use the disclosures as the basis for withdrawing money from companies they consider unprepared for rising risk related to regulation and climatic convulsions.

But the CERES agenda may be too clever by half. Disclosure of climate risk could cut against the global warming movement, by revealing the potential of regulatory climate policy to wreck the economy.

For example, the application of Clean Air Act permitting rules to stationary sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions–an inescapable consequence of EPA establishing greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards for new motor vehicles in response to the Supreme Court’s April 2007 Massachusetts v. EPA decision–would potentially expose an estimated 1.2 million previously unregulated firms to new controls, paperwork, penalties, and litigation.

Moreover, the endangerment finding prerequisite to EPA adoption of GHG controls for motor vehicles could also compel the Agency to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for GHG-related “air pollution.” Logically, NAAQS for CO2 and other GHGs would have to be set below current atmospheric levels and, thus, could not be attained even if EPA shut down every car, power plant, and factory in the United States. Once the regulatory cascade starts, “climate policy risk” to the U.S. economy could easily become a gigantic Anti-Stimulus Package. For the gory details, see my comment on EPA’s endangerment proposal, especially pp. 33-48.

It’s not enough for Ceres and other eco-zealots to clobber fossil energy producers and energy-intensive manufacturers with costly regulation. They want those companies to scare away investors in advance of climate regulations via public disclosure of the potential burdens. However, the Ceres strategy could backfire, because targeted corporations could use the mandated information to publicize the destructive impacts of climate policy on jobs, growth, investment, and shareholder value. Such information would reveal that the risks of climate policy vastly outweigh those of climate change.   

A recent report by New York University school of Law’s Institute for Policy Integrity suggests as much. See my commentary on Masterresource.Org.

That may seem counter-intuitive, because burning ethanol merely puts back into the air the carbon dioxide (CO2) that corn crops recently pulled out of it, whereas burning gasoline liberates carbon that had been stored in geologic deposits for millions of years.

But other factors come into play, such as the fossil energy inputs required to produce the corn, turn it into ethanol, and deliver the ethanol to market. 

In addition, as EPA argues in its proposed rule to implement the renewable fuel standard program established by the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), expanding corn production into forest and grass lands can release substantial amounts of carbon stored in soils and trees.

Similarly, when U.S. farmers grow corn in areas previously used to produce soy beans, for example, farmers in Brazil have an incentive to convert forest land into soy plantations.

As you might expect, EPA’s use of life-cycle analysis, although required by EISA, drives the ethanol lobby and its congressional allies up the wall. They claim it is ridiculous to link increased corn production here to increased CO2 emissions in developing countries.

But, as my colleague, agricultural commodity analyst Dave Juday, demonstrates, the numbers paint a very clear picture. With Dave’s permission, I reproduce below an email he sent around earlier today.

*  *  *

With regard to GHG and the EPA’s RFS [renewable fuel standard] 2 rule, … the concept of “indirect land use changes” (ILUC) get criticized for being faulty, but it actually is pretty sound.  

Consider, if ethanol drives up US corn  plantings (which it did) and drives down US soybean plantings and production (which it did, because the US – the largest producer and exporter – has only so much farm land and not much tillable acreage to expand) and thereby raises the world price of soybeans, it raises the incentives to grow soybeans elsewhere in the world.  It just so happens Brazil – which is the world’s second largest producer and exporter – is the most likely place where additional soybeans will be grown on virgin land because that is where the virgin land is. 

The real weak link in this GHG lifecycle emissions concept is the ability to measure and value the carbon emissions and sequestration and the process by which “value” gets assigned to practices and manufacturing processes.  Yet, as might be expected from ethanol advocates, it is the simple, fundamental, and rational economic concept that is argued against.    Consider the perspectives shared by a lobbyist and a US Senator on the issue of “indirect land use changes” driven by US biofuel policy:

•  Basically, the EPA has determined that the production of ethanol in America is forcing land use changes in Brazil and other foreign countries to destroy their valuable rain forests to produce farm commodities to make up for reduced exports of these commodities from the United States. Mr. Chairman, I have been in Washington for a long time, but I have never heard of a more bizarre concept. – Tom Buis, CEO, Growth Energy
•  Every chance I get, I’m going to bring this issue up. It’s so obvious that the EPA’s rationale doesn’t meet the common sense test.  It’s ridiculous to think that Brazilian farmers are looking to see what Iowa farmers are doing to determine how they run their own business, and quite frankly it’s plain unfair to farmers. –  Honorable Charles Grassley, US Senator (R-IA)

Addressing these comments above is one of those cases where a picture is indeed worth 1,000 words:

SOURCE: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service: Production, Supply, and Distribution Online

Added: May 29, 2009

Lisa Lerer delves into the ”life cycle analysis” controversy in the May 26 issue of Politico.  Farm state Democrats are threatening to oppose the Waxman-Markey bill if, as required by EISA, EPA considers the indirect impacts on land-use changes abroad when determining the life-cycle CO2 emissions of domestic ethanol production. 

The same lawmakers enthusiastically supported the EISA renewable fuel program as a global warming policy when they thought it would rig the market in favor of corn farmers. Now they’re threatening to derail Obama’s cap-and-trade initiative if EPA follows the law they helped enact. 

Obama campaigned on a platform of CHANGE, but he may find that in Washington still, Pork Rules and Corn Is King.

Most media coverage of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act  of 2009 (ACES), focuses on the bill’s cap-and-trade program and the free rationing coupons (emission allowances) that the bill’s co-sponsors, Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA), had to hand out to utilities and other interests to secure their support for the legislation.

But the cap-and-trade program occupies only one of four of the bill’s main sections (”titles”).  Other titles contain a host of mandates and “incentives” (carrots and sticks) to reshape energy and transportation markets.   

ACES, for example:

• Requires utilities to meet a certain percentage of their load with electricity generated from renewable sources, like wind, biomass, solar, and geothermal.
• Promotes small-scale “distributed generation” of renewable electricity by offering three renewable electricity credits (instead of one credit) for each MWh produced.
• Authorizes electric power generators to create a Carbon Storage Research Consortium with the power to assess “fees” (aka taxes) totalling approximately $1 billion annually to fund carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration plants.
• Directs the EPA Administrator to hand out free rationing coupons to subsidize CCS.
• Establishes a CCS mandate requiring new coal-fired power plants to emit 65% less carbon dioxide if permitted after 2020, and emit 50% less if permitted between 2009 and 2020; also requires EPA to review these standards not later than 2025 and every five years thereafter.
• Requires utilities to ”consider” developing plans to support electric vehicle infrastructure, and provides assistance (including free emission allowances) to subsidize electric vehicles and infrastructure.
• Mandates stricter building codes achieving 30% higher energy efficiency in 2010 and 50% higher in 2016 for new buildings, and establishes a “building retrofit program” for existing residential and nonresidential buildings.
• Mandates tougher energy efficiency standards for indoor and outdoor lighting, hot food holding cabinets, bottle-type drinking water dispensers, hot tubs, commercial-grade natural gas furnaces, televisions, and other appliances.
• Requires the President, EPA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and California to establish greenhouse gas (GHG)/fuel economy standards for new passenger cars and light trucks.
• Requires and sets deadlines for EPA to establish GHG emission standards for heavy-duty engines and vehicles and non-road vehicles including marine vessels, locomotives, and aircraft.
• Requires States to establish goals and submit transportation plans to reduce transport sector GHG emissions, and imposes sanctions on States that fail to comply.
• Requires the Deparment of Energy (DOE) to establish industrial energy-efficiency standards.

These measures are economically and environmentally irrational even if you believe that global warming is a “planetary emergency.” As the Charles River Associates (CRA) report for the National Black Chamber of Commerce points out, the renewable electricity, CCS, electric vehicle, and energy efficiency mandates will not yield net emission reductions beyond what the bill’s emission caps already require. The targeted interventions may accelerate GHG reductions in some industries or sectors, but that just allows emissions to increase elsewhere in the economy without breaking the cap.

The rationale for cap-and-trade is that it allows the market to find the least-costly methods of reducing emissions. By superimposing renewable electricity, CCS, electric vehicle, and energy efficiency mandates on that system, Waxman-Markey dictates the means as well as the goals.

There are two possible outcomes. First, which is exceedingly unlikely, the cap motivates reductions in exactly the same ways as the targeted mandates and incentives. In that case, observes CRA, the mandates “would waste resources on needless monitoring, measuring, enforcement and compliance.”

If, as almost certainly would happen, the mandates compel different actions and investments than industry would otherwise undertake to meet the cap, then the same emission reductions would be achieved at higher cost.  The targeted mandates and incentives “can only substitute more costly GHG cuts for those that could have been made at lower cost.”

So what is the point? Why tout cap-and-trade as an “efficient,” “market-based” solution and then gunk it up with cookie-cutter, command-and-control measures?

Several reasons come to mind including deep distrust of markets, an abiding belief in old-fashioned central planning, the desire to rig market outcomes to benefit or punish certain interests, and the desire to create more work (endless full employment) for bureaucrats and lawyers.

One that should not be discounted, though, is the pleasure some people derive from placing their heels on other people’s necks. Politics is chiefly about the organization and application of power. It tends to attract people who enjoy bullying and coercing others. To regulate is to coerce. Command-and-control regulation is more coercive than the market-based variety. So despite their real or feigned enthusiasm for cap-and-trade, many climate activists are hopelessly addicted to mandates.

The National Black Chamber of Commerce (NBCC) today released a study by Charles River Associates (CRA) on the economic impacts of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), the regulatory climate bill sponsored by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA).

The results aren’t pretty, and they generally get worse over time as the Act’s emission caps tighten. Relative to baseline levels, ACESA would:

• Reduce employment by 2.3 million jobs in 2015, 2.7 million jobs in 2020, 2.5 million jobs in 2030, and 3 million jobs in 2050;
• Lower average annual wages by $170 in 2015, $270 in 2020, $400 in 2030, and $960 in 2050; and,
• Decrease average household purchasing power by $730 in 2015, $800 in 2020, $830 in 2030, and $940 in 2050.

More valuable than any of these estimates, which depend on many variables that can change unpredictably, is the report’s clear economic logic and common sense.

The report specifically debunks two myths propagated by ACESA proponents. One is that there would be virtually no cost to consumers because (a) utilities would receive lots of free emission allowances, avoiding costs they would otherwise pass on to ratepayers, and (b) revenues from auctioned allowances would be returned as dividends to low-income households.

What this myth overlooks is that emission caps inescapably–and by design–increase the cost of producing and consuming energy. The “cap” in cap-and-trade “works”–that is, reduces emissions–by creating an artificial scarcity in the right to produce and use fossil (carbon-emitting) energy. This drives up the price of coal, oil, and natural gas. It also increases reliance on higher-cost non-fossil energy. 

About 85% of our total energy is carbon-emitting, and about 99% of all transport sector energy is carbon-emitting. Since energy is used to produce and move everything from autos to food to houses to bytes of electronic information, ACESA’s impacts would cascade through the economy. In the report’s words:

This analysis reveals that businesses and consumers would face higher energy and transportation costs under ACESA, which would lead to increased costs of other goods and services throughout the economy. As the costs of goods and services rise, household disposable income and household consumption would fall. Wages and returns on investment would also fall, resulting in lower productivity growth and reduce employment opportunities. 

Although free allocations and revenue recycling can ameliorate the impacts of cap-and-trade on some industries, communities, or income groups, “the cost of bringing emissions down to the levels required by the caps cannot be avoided.”

Proponents also claim ACESA can revive the economy by creating millions of “green jobs.” The CRA study agrees that ACESA would lead to “increases in spending on energy efficiency and renewable energy, and as a result that significant numbers of people would be employed in ‘green jobs’ that would not exist in a no carbon policy world.” However, proponents ignore both the fossil energy-related jobs ACESA would destroy and other job losses due to rising energy costs and lower productivity:

This study finds that even after accounting for green jobs, there is a substantial and long-term net reduction in total labor earnings and employment. This is the unintended but predictable consequence of investing to create a “green energy future.”

Several other findings are noteworthy:

• Declines in employment are heavier in the Mountain West (-3.5%), Great Plains (-1.4%), Oklahoma and Texas (-1.8%), Missiippie Valley (-1.5%), Mid-Atlantic (-1.3%), Southeast (-1.1%), and Midwest (-0.6%)  than in California (-0.4%) and Northeast (-0.3%). ”The Northeast and California fare better than other regions because of their initial economic circumstances. Namely, these regions’ industries are less energy-intensive, as is hte overall composition of industry.” By sheer coincidence (not), the bill’s co-sponsors, Henry Waxman and Ed Markey hail from California and the Northeast.
• The bill’s renewable electricity and energy efficiency mandates  make neither economic nor environmental sense even if we assume that global warming is a “planetary emergency.”  The rationale for cap-and-trade is that it allows the market to find the least-cost methods of reducing emissions. By superimposing a system of renewable electricity and energy efficiency mandates on that system, ACESA would dictate the means as well as the goals. There are two possibilities. If, by coincidence, the cap itself motivated all of the actions required to comply with those mandates, then the mandates “would waste resources on needless monitoring, measuring, enforcement and compliance.” If, as is more likely, the mandates compel industry to buy more renewable energy or invest more in efficiency upgrades than it otherwise would to comply with the cap, the total emissions reduced would not change but industry’s (hence consumers’) costs would be higher. The renewable electricity and energy efficiency mandates “can only substitute more costly GHG cuts for those that could have been made at lower cost.”
• The economic impacts estimated in the report are conservative because they make a very favorable assumption in favor of ACESA, namely, that domestic industries would be able to exceed the cap by about 30% during 2012-2050 by purchasing international offsets (e.g. payments to preserve forests in development countries). Access to international offsets are especially important to cost-containment in ACESA’s early phase, totalling 83% of the required emission “reductions” in 2015. “However, in light of the difficulties in measuring, verifying, and ensuring the permanence of these offsets, international negotiations have stressed domestic sources of emission reductions over international offsets.” The Kyoto II treaty that will be negotiated in Copenhagen “might allow far fewer” offsets than ACESA would provide. ”This would drive up costs substantially.”