The Council on Foreign Relations has released a paper, “G-8’s gradual move to post-Kyoto climate change policy.” It reads very much like a document produced by the European Commission, but was written by a CFR author who has recently addressed this topic and written equally often about AIDS, opium trading and the LaStatetino vote.
Intentionally or otherwise, the author paints a picture rather at odds with Kyoto’s reality. For example, she states that “Some Kyoto participants have found it difficult to meet their assigned targets—ranging from 5 percent to 8 percent below 1990 levels (except EU countries, which have special targets).” Of course, -5% to -8% is not the range of Kyoto promises. Australia, for example, promised not to increase its emissions by more than +8% above 1990 levels. But the implication is that such difficulties are the exception, not the rule. In fact, the portion of Kyoto parties who actually did promise an emission reduction (from 1990 levels) are on track to have to purchase their entire “reduction”.
Note the “except EU countries…” Kyotophiles are aware that the European countries – using even the more limited definition of EU Member States – account for 25 of the 35 countries covered under Kyoto. The EU-15, as she does admit, rearranged their touted, promised reductions so that 10 of the 15 lowered their promised reductions, with 5 of the 15 promising emission increases. At least she said “assigned targets” and not “reduction promises”.
Further, only two EU countries (and arguably none of them) aren’t among those “some”: the UK for reasons described below, and Sweden, which made a promise to increase its emissions, but not beyond a certain point. Both project being at or very near to their promises. At least reading the UK press they, too, have found this difficult to achieve, so it is fair to say that all of them have found it difficult. Indeed, not one country has actually reduced emissions since Kyoto was agreed in 1997; those countries on track to meet their promises are former Soviet bloc nations who reduced emissions the old fashioned way, through economic collapse.
Stating things more plainly, most of the 10 non-EU countries have had trouble meeting their promise, as have nearly all of the 25 EU countries not given a free ride due to having collapsed economically. The word choice is either uninformed or misleading cheerleading.
The enthusiasm for Europe’s leadership runs throughout. As noted the author acknowledges EU’s Article 4 “burden sharing” (shifting) agreement, writing “The protocol allowed the European Union to assign individual countries their own targets, which go as high as 28 percent below 1990 levels.” [link to “Evolution Markets” homepage provided in original, the relevance of which is unclear]
The 28% is from tiny Luxembourg, this promise a consequence of it having shuttered the largest emitting facility after 1990; similarly, Germany and the UK made (numerically) bold promises of -21% and -12.5%, conditioned upon their having mothballed East German industry and “dashed to gas,” respectively, both one-offs that occurred after the 1990 baseline. This all explains why Europe’s one must-have in Kyoto was a 1990 baseline.
The author fails to mention that Europe’s promises also range to as low as +27 [Portugal] above 1990, that only 8 of the EU-15 actually promised reductions from 1990, 5 of them greater than the EU-wide promise of -8% and 3 of them more forgiving, that 2 countries promised no reduction at all and 5 of them promised increases but not beyond a certain amount.
Further protective of Europe, the author writes “During the 2007 Bali conference, the United States, along with countries such as Canada and Japan, blocked an EU proposal for mandatory emissions cuts of 25 percent to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020—jeopardizing negotiations.” She fails to mention that at the 2005 COP in Montreal, Europe and Canada rejected the effort to make Kyoto binding and enforceable, which she implies throughout Kyoto is (it isn’t, as the effort to make it so, and Article 18, make clear). Of course, this served to keep negotiations alive, as no one apparently wants to be bound by their global warming rhetoric and will only move forward on the condition they won’t.
Statements like “The Bush administration and Republican lawmakers opposed to emissions caps have been touting the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate” are gratuitously partisan given that most lawmakers oppose emissions caps; the Democratic Congress says it wants Bush to act on CO2 just as they claimed to want the Republican Congress to adopt CO2 controls, but haven’t been keen on adopting such a thing themselves.
There’s plenty more and, as they say, read the whole thing, but be forewarned it is advocacy, not analysis.