The Administrations Negotiating Strategy
On March 4, 1998, Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat reassured the House Commerce Subcommittee that the U.S. was committed to getting “meaningful” developing country participation. Under questioning, however, Eizenstat admitted that the Clinton Administration will sign the Kyoto Protocol as it now stands even if developing countries do not agree to participate. When asked whether this takes away the U.S.s leverage to get developing country participation, Eizenstat replied that it will give negotiators greater leverage because it will show that the U.S. is serious about stopping global warming.
Kyoto Protocol Can be Fixed
Robert Stavins, professor of public policy and Chair of the Environment and Natural Resources Program at Harvards Kennedy School of Government, said at a briefing for Capitol Hill staff members that the Kyoto Protocol is flawed, but can become a good foundation for future greenhouse policies if it is fixed.
To fix the protocol it will be necessary, says Stavins, to include at least four developing countries: China, Brazil, India, and South Korea. Stavins argued that limiting the protocol to developed countries will cause energy intensive industries to relocate to developing countries, driving up future emission control costs for these countries.
Another remedy for the protocol is clearly defined and workable rules for an international emission trading system. Such a system, argues Stavins, will drastically cut abatement costs for the industrialized countries. He claims that the U.S. could cut its compliance costs by as much as 90 percent with the right system.
Stavins also recommends that rather than distribute emissions allowances free of charge to U.S. firms, the U.S. government should auction the allowances, using the proceeds to lower federal taxes on labor and investment (BNA Daily Environment Report, February 27, 1998).
Kyoto is Doomed to Fail
In an article in Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998), Richard N. Cooper of Harvard University argues that the Kyoto Protocol as it now stands is “bound to fail.” The Kyoto framework is a set of agreed-upon national objectives that allows each country to comply in its own way. This will be achieved through trading emission rights.
The problem, as Cooper sees it, is that it will be impossible to arrive at an agreed upon distribution of emission rights between rich and poor countries, precluding developing country participation which will be needed to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions.
There are three reasons, says Cooper, why collective action on climate change will be difficult. First, “Effective restraint must . . . involve all actual and prospective major emitters of greenhouse gases.” Second, “the rewards from restraints on greenhouse gases will come in the politically distant future, while the costs will be incurred in the political present.” Third, reducing greenhouse gas emissions “will involve changes in behavior by hundreds of millions if not billions of people, not merely the fiat of 180 or so governments.”
Other problems, of course, involve the high costs of compliance. If a family of four in the U.S. wishes to sustain its current level of emissions it could be required to pay $2,200, says Cooper. U.S. transfers to the rest of the world could be as high as $130 billion a year.
What then does Cooper recommend? “[M]ost of the reduction in the rich countries must come at or near the points of final demand, where the number of consumers is greatest,” says Cooper. “The reductions must be achieved by some combination of taxation, exhortation, publicity, and environmental education.”
Since it is necessary for governments to change the behavior of its citizens it may be far easier for the parties of the Framework Convention on Climate Change to agree to a common use of emission reduction instruments rather than to a national allocation of emission rights. The instrument that Cooper favors is a carbon emission tax.
Monitoring such a tax could fall under the authority of the International Monetary Fund, since all “important” countries, with the exception of Cuba and North Korea, “hold annual consultations with the IMF on their macroeconomic policies, including the overall level and composition of their tax revenues.”
The IMF would report to a monitoring agent of the treaty and these reports “could be supplemented by international inspection of major taxpayers such as electric utilities, and the tax agencies of participating countries.
Finally, Cooper points out that carbon taxes would yield $750 billion worldwide, some of which should go to the United Nations to pay for refugee programs, peacekeeping and other UN programs.