A report published in October 2012 by the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) links soaring corn and agricultural commodity prices to food riots and turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East.

Although several factors may contribute to political unrest, acknowledge Dr. Yaneer Bar-Yam and two co-authors, “the timing of violent protests in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 as well as earlier riots in 2008 coincides with large peaks in global food prices.” In poor countries with little or no local agriculture to “buffer” swings in global supply conditions, the central government “may be perceived to have a critical role in food security. Failure to provide security undermines the very reason for existence of the political system.”

In short:

When the ability of the political system to provide security for the population breaks down, popular support disappears. Conditions of widespread threat to security are particularly present when food is inaccessible to the population at large.

Soaring food prices triggered food riots in both 2008 and 2011.

Figure explanation (references omitted): Time dependence of FAO Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011. Red dashed vertical lines correspond to beginning dates of “food riots” and protests associated with the major recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. The overall death toll is reported in parentheses. Blue vertical line indicates the date, December 13, 2010, on which Dr. Bar-Yam and colleagues submitted a report to the U.S. government, warning of the link between food prices, social unrest and political instability. Inset shows FAO Food Price Index from 1990 to 2011.

At first glance, the NECSI report may seem to belabor the obvious. Hunger breeds desperation; desperation, violence; and violence, instability. But the report does more than correlate food riots with food prices. It also postulates a threshold beyond which food prices likely trigger violence.

In a follow-on study published last month, Bar-Yam and colleagues examine the political repercussions of the U.S. 2012 summer drought, which led to a new increase in corn prices. Through the fall, global maize (corn) prices ”remained at a threshold above which the riots and revolutions had predominantly occurred” in 2011. On the other hand, commodity prices in general “remained at the threshold above which violence was found in 2008-09 and 2010-11.” So what happened?

Violent protest broke out in South Africa, “a heavily maize-dependent country” where ”consumer food indices have increased dramatically.” 

Coinciding with the food price increases this summer, massive labor strikes in mining and agriculture have led to the greatest single incident of social violence since the fall of apartheid in 1994. Worker demands for dramatic pay increases reflect that their wages have not kept up with drastic increases in the prices of necessities, especially food.

Food-related protests and riots in 2012 also occurred in Haiti and Argentina.

The graph below shows the food price threshold above which riots are predicted to occur. The authors note that since mid-2011 the global food price index has “hovered around the threshold value.”

Figure explanation (references omitted): Global food price index since 2002. The threshold above which widespread food riots and revolutions occurred in 2008-08 and 2010-11 is shown both without (solid red) and with (dashed red) inflation. Whether incomes of poor populations increase with inflation depends on local conditions and national policies.

The authors argue that, “When prices are significantly higher than the threshold, as they were in 2007-08 and 2010-11, widespread violence can be expected. When the prices are proximate to the threshold, incidents of violence should be more sensitive to the specifics of local conditions,” such as national income support policies and the extent to which local prices move with global prices.

In South Africa, though, “The unusually violent and deadly worker riots at platinum mines starting in August of 2012 coincided both with record global maize prices and record high prices for basic food items . . .” Similarly, “xenophobic riots in May of 2008 stood out as the bloodiest violence since apartheid. These riots coincided with food riots around the world during a previous peak of global food prices.”

Figure explanation (references omitted): Consumer price index for bread and cereals in South Africa since 2002 (black, left axis) and global maize prices (blue, right axis). Red solid vertical line indicates beginning of deadly riots in platinum mines, and red dashed line indicates period of severe xenophobic riots. Local prices have increased with global prices but have not correspondingly decreased when prices declined.

So in 2012-2013 what is pushing maize prices up to and beyond the violence threshold? The drought is a factor. The researchers also blame two policies: the “deregulation of commodity futures markets” and the “diversion of almost 50% of the US maize crop to ethanol.” Those policies, they contend, “are ill-advised and should be changed.”

Bar-Yam and his colleagues are surely right about the Soviet-style central planning scheme euphemistically called the “Renewable Fuel Standard.” They do not explain (at least in these papers) why curbing economic liberty would make commodity markets more efficient or make food more affordable over the long term. Blaming speculators for causing or exacerbating food shortages and famines is one of the world’s oldest economic fallacies.

Responding to the anti-Renewable Fuel Standard Hill briefing discussed on this blog yesterday, Tom Buis, CEO of ethanol trade group Growth Energy, asserted that “homegrown American renewable energy provides consumers with a choice and savings” (Greenwire, subscription required). Rubbish. Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), ethanol consumption is a mandate, not a choice. 

Buis’s claim that ethanol relieves pain at the pump sounds plausible because a gallon of ethanol is cheaper than a gallon of gasoline. However, ethanol has about one-third less energy than gasoline and does not make up the difference in price. Consequently, the higher the ethanol blend, the worse mileage your car gets, and the more money you spend to drive a given distance.

FuelEconomy.Gov, a Web site jointly administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) calculates how much a typical motorist would spend in a year to fill up a flex-fuel vehicle with either E85 (motor fuel made with 85% ethanol) or regular gasoline. The exact bottom line changes as gasoline and ethanol prices change. The big picture, though, is always the same: Ethanol is a net money loser for the consumer.

For example, at prices prevailing in late November 2012, it cost $500 more per year to drive on E85. When I checked FuelEconomy.Gov last week, E85 cost the average motorist an additional $600 per year.

A bad deal just got worse. At today’s prices, it would cost an extra $700-$900 a year to switch from regular gasoline to E85. Some savings! Small wonder that our ‘choice’ to buy ethanol must be mandated.

This morning I attended a briefing on “The Renewable Fuel Standard: Pitfalls, Challenges, and the Need for Congressional Action in 2013.” Steve Ellis of Taxpayers for Common Sense moderated a panel of six experts. Although each expert spotlighted a different set of harms arising from the RFS, reflecting the core concern of his or her organization, this was a team effort, with panelists frequently affirming each other’s key points. Collectively, they made a strong case that the RFS is a “costly failure.” The briefing’s purpose was to demonstrate the need for reform rather than outline a specific reform agenda. Panelists nonetheless agreed that, at a minimum, Congress should scale back the RFS blending targets for corn ethanol.

Kristin Sundell of ActionAid explained how the RFS exacerbates world hunger, undermining U.S. foreign aid and international security objectives. The RFS diverts 15% of the world corn supply from food to fuel, putting upward pressure on food prices. A recent Tufts University study estimates that U.S. ethanol expansion during the past 6 years cost developing countries more than $5.5 billion in higher prices for corn imports. In Guatemala, the additional expense ($28 million) in 2011 effectively cancelled out all U.S. food aid and agricultural assistance for that year. Food price spikes, partly due to the RFS, were a factor in the recent turmoil in the Middle East. ”Congress can’t control the weather, but they can control misguided energy policies that could cause a global food crisis,” Sundell said.

Kristin Wilcox of the American Frozen Food Institute discussed the RFS’s impact on food consumers. Corn is both the chief animal feed and an ingredient in about 75% of all frozen foods. Consequently, RFS-induced increases in corn prices drive up “the cost of producing a wide range of foods and leads to higher food bills for consumers.” In addition, when corn prices go up, so do the prices of other commodities that compete with corn such as wheat and soybeans. ”Our position is very simple,” Wilcox said: “food should be used to fuel bodies, not vehicle engines.” She concluded: “Trying to change the price at the pump should not burden consumers with increased prices in the grocery check out aisle.”

Actually, as Geoff Moody of the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers pointed out, the RFS aggravates rather than alleviates pain at the pump. Graphs from the Energy Information Administration show that biofuels are more expensive than gasoline on an energy-content (per-mile) basis. The higher the ethanol blend, the more expensive it is to drive, which is why fewer than 4% of flex-fuel vehicle owners fill up with E85 (motor fuel blended with 85% ethanol).

Moody’s major point was that the RFS is becoming increasingly unworkable. Already the 135 billion gallon U.S. motor fuel market is nearly saturated with E10. By 2022, U.S. motor fuel consumption is projected to be about 25% lower than Congress assumed when it expanded the RFS in 2007. If Congress does not revise the RFS, refiners will have to sell E20 or higher, but the existing retail infrastructure is not equipped to handle blends higher than E10. A typical service station may clear a profit of only $45,000 on motor fuel sales, but replacing pumps and storage tanks to handle higher blends can cost $50,000 to $200,000.

Scott Faber of the Environmental Working Group discussed the RFS program’s environmental impacts, especially changes in land use. From 2008 to 2011, high crop prices and crop subsidies contributed to the conversion of 23 million acres of wetlands and grasslands, an area the size of Indiana. About 8.4 million acres were converted to corn production. “We have lost more wetlands and grasslands in the last four years than we have in the last 40 years,” Faber said. If lawmakers knew in 2007 what we now know about the RFS’s many serious unintended consequences, they would not have enacted the program, Faber opined.

Tom Elam of Farm Econ LLC discussed the RFS program’s impacts on livestock producers and meat and poultry consumers. Since Congress created the RFS in 2005, annual feed costs have increased by $8.8 billion for chicken producers and $1.9 billion for turkey producers. Consequences of those higher costs include an 8 billion pound decline in poultry production, eight major bankruptcies, a half billion dollar loss in farm income, and higher prices for consumers.

Retail broiler prices, for example, increased from $1.74/lb in 2005 to $1.97/lb in December 2012. Turkey prices similarly rose from $1.07/lb in 2005 to $1.80/lb in early 2012. Beef and pork prices too rose along with feed costs, with the result that U.S. per capita meat and poultry consumption declined by about 10% since 2008.

The RFS may be good for corn farmers, but it fosters economic inefficiency. For every $1 of added ethanol production, food production costs increased $2.89. In other words, food producers bear a cost “more than twice the value of the ethanol created.”

Jim Currie of the National Marine Manufacturers Association explained the perils of E15 to the $72 billion per year U.S. recreational boating industry. Boats and other small gasoline-powered engines are designed to run on motor fuels blended with 10% ethanol or less. Consequently, “anything above E10 poses serious problems, including performance issues like stalling, corrosion leading to oil or fuel leaks, increased emissions and damaged valves, rubber fuel lines and gaskets.”

Higher blends are trouble for two reasons. First, ethanol is a solvent and at increased concentrations eats away at engine components. Second, ethanol is an oxygenate, and the higher the oxygen content of a fuel, the hotter the burn. Tests supervised by the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Lab prove “time and time again that marine engines and, by extrapolation, other types of engines, simply cannot tolerate the high levels of additional oxygen that this fuel blend forces into the engine.” Currie presented lab test photos of such engine damage (pp. 3-7 of this Power Point).

Valve rupture from E15

Touching on the potential risks E15 poses to automobiles, he quoted the AAA’s statement of last December: “Only about 12 million out of the more than 240 million light-duty vehicles on the roads today are approved by manufacturers to use E15 gasoline.”

Currie’s conclusion drew applause from the Hill crowd:

As I am the last presenter today, let me offer a hypothetical scenario, based on what you have heard. Suppose an organization approached the Hill today and said, “We have a great idea for a new policy. It will largely benefit a small number of people in one part of the country, and members of Congress from there will support it wholeheartedly. The downside is that it will hurt the environment; and conservation practices; and will drive up food costs; and hurt people in developing countries; and will potentially damage every small engine in the country, including those in motorcycles and snowmobiles and ATVs and lawnmowers and generators; and it will damage boat engines; and it will potentially damage most automobile engines and will void your engine warranty if you use it. But we want you to enact a law requiring the American consumer to use it anyway.” That’s where we are today, and we think this law needs to be changed.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) is not bullish on biofuel. That’s what I infer from “Biofuels in the United States: Context and Outlook,” a Power Point presentation given by the agency at a biofuels workshop in Washington, D.C. last week. I suspect many in attendance were not pleased. 

Three slides in particular are noteworthy.

Slide no. 19 projects that even in 2040, the quantity of biofuel in the U.S. motor fuel market will be about 10 billion gallons lower than the 36 billion gallons per year required by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) by 2022.

Slides 8 and 9 may explain why. Simply put, although a gallon of ethanol is cheaper than a gallon of petroleum-based fuel, gasoline and diesel deliver more bang for buck than their ‘renewable’ counterparts. It is cheaper to drive one mile on gasoline or diesel than on ethanol or biodiesel fuel.

That ethanol aggrevates rather than alleviates pain at the pump may also be inferred from FuelEconomy.Gov, a Web site jointly administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE).

Because ethanol has one-third less energy than gasoline and does not make up the difference in price, the higher the ethanol blend, the more money you spend on each mile driven. At current prices, it would cost the average driver $600 a year to switch from regular gasoline to E85, a fuel that is 85 percent ethanol.

Source: FuelEconomy.Gov

Or, if you don’t trust your government, check out the American Automobile Association’s Daily Fuel Gauge Report. The report for today, Jan. 28, 2013, is posted in the marquee and at the top of this page.

U.S. biofuel expansion has cost developing countries $6.6 billion in higher food costs, estimates Tufts University economist Timothy A. Wise in Fueling the Food Crisis, a report published by ActionAid. A 10-minute video interview with Wise about his research is available here.

The 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), established by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), exerts long-term upward pressure on grain prices by diverting an ever-growing quantity of corn from food and feed to auto fuel. This is great for corn farmers but not good for U.S. consumers and harmful to millions of people in developing countries, many of whom live in extreme poverty.

“Commodity prices are a small percentage of the retail price of food in the US” because “we heavily process our food,” notes Wise. In contrast, in developing countries, ”commodity prices are a bigger percentage of the retail price, in part because people buy whole foods more often than processed foods.” Even small commodity price increases ”can have a big impact on local market prices in developing countries.”

As it happens, during the same period that U.S. ethanol production and corn prices increased, many developing countries became more dependent on grain imports to feed their people and livestock. The recent drought-induced spike in U.S. corn prices is “just the latest episode in a devastating, protracted global food crisis that has pushed millions into poverty and hunger around the globe over the past 6 years,” argues the ActionAid report.

To assess the impact of biofuel expansion on developing countries, Wise used a conservative estimate of ethanol’s contribution to corn prices and multiplied that by the quantity of U.S. corn imported by those countries. A summary of key findings follows:

• Net Food Importing Developing Countries, among the most vulnerable to food price increases, incurred ethanol-related costs of $2.1 billion.
• Thirteen developing countries incurred per-capita impacts greater than Mexico’s (where tortilla prices have risen 69% since 2005), and they include a wide spectrum of large and small countries from all regions of the developing world – Colombia, Malaysia, Botswana, Syria.
• North African countries saw large impacts, with $1.4 billion in ethanol-related import costs, led by Egypt ($679 million). Other countries experiencing social unrest – Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Iran, Yemen – also suffered high impacts, highlighting the link between rising food prices and political instability.
• Central American countries felt impacts nearly those of Mexico, scaled to population. The region has seen its dependence on food imports rise over the last 20 years, and corn imports cost an extra $368 million from 2006-11 due to U.S. ethanol expansion. Guatemala saw the largest impacts, with $91 million in related costs. In 2010-11 alone, U.S. biofuel expansion cost Guatemalans $28 million – an amount nearly equivalent to U.S. food aid to Guatemala over the same period.
• Latin American partners to trade agreements with the United States saw high costs, as import-dependence grows. The six-year ethanol-related cost of corn imports was $2.4 billion for Latin American nations involved in NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the bilateral agreements with Panama, Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

A new study by the Energy Research Policy Foundation, Inc. (EPRINC) further debunks the popular talking point of USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack and the Renewable Fuel Association (RFA) that ethanol reduced gasoline prices by $0.89/gal in 2010 and $1.09/gal in 2011.

As noted previously on this site (here and here), Vilsack and the RFA tout a study by Iowa State University’s Center for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD), which concluded that if ethanol production had remained at year 2000 levels, the U.S. motor fuel supply would have been billions of gallons smaller and, thus, significantly pricier in 2010 and 2011. Subsequent studies by FarmEcon, LLC and MIT/UC Davis spotlighted CARD’s unrealistic assumption that the refining industry would not have increased gasoline production to meet consumer demand in the absence of policies mandating and subsidizing the blending and sale of increasing quantities of ethanol as motor fuel.

The EPRINC study (Ethanol’s Lost Promise: An Assessment of the Economic Consequences of the Renewable Fuel Mandate) shows, in addition, that if ethanol output had remained constant at the year 2000 level, refiners could have made up for the shortfall without importing or even refining “a single additional barrel of crude oil.” The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) has increased ethanol production by about 400,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) since 2000. A “remarkably small operational adjustment” in refineries’ product mix – a 1.8% increase in gasoline production — could have covered an ethanol shortfall of 400,000 bbl/d in 2011.

Figure Explanation: The figure shows how much additional gasoline would be produced if yields were 1, 2 or 3 percentage points higher, given actual crude oil runs through U.S. refineries for the given year. The orange dotted line shows the increase in gasoline production if yields were raised by 2.3 percentage points – this is the range in which gasoline yields moved during 2000 to 2011. Finally, the red and bluelines are the amount of ethanol that would be missing from the market if ethanol blending was capped at 400,000 bbl/d. The chart demonstrates that a 400,000 bbl/d ethanol shortfall could have been covered in 2011 had gasoline yields been just 1.8 percentage points higher, from 45% to 46.8%. A 46.8% gasoline yield is equal to or lower than the gasoline yield during 3 of the past 11 years. It is also well under the 2.3 percentage point range in which yields bounced during 2000 – 2011.

Yesterday The Hill‘s Energy Blog reported on a brief filed by the EPA in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:

The documents filed Monday with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reveal the reasoning behind EPA’s move to shoot down the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) challenge of the renewable fuel standard (RFS). EPA determined that enough advanced biofuels — generally understood to be made from non-food products — existed to meet that portion of the RFS for 2012.

“EPA reasonably considered the production capacity likely to be developed throughout the year, while API would have EPA rely narrowly and solely on proven past cellulosic biofuel production,” EPA said in its brief. “EPA reasoned that lowering the advanced biofuel volume in these circumstances would be inconsistent with EISA’s [the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007] energy security and greenhouse gas reduction goals, and decided to leave the statutory advanced biofuel volume unchanged.”

The (main) question here is what the 2012 cellulosic biofuel requirements should be set at. The EPA is arguing that they took a reasonable look at capacity production and put out what they thought could be developed, while the American Petroleum Institute is only looking at historic cellulosic biofuel production. So who is being reasonable?

Bob Greco over at the Energy Tomorrow blog produced this graph:

The large blue bars indicate the original blending requirements under the Energy Independence and Security Act. To the EPA’s credit, they had nothing to do with the original blending requirements. The lighter turquiose-ish are the finalized numbers requested by the EPA, as they are allowed to adjust requirements to fit reality. The red number represents actual commercial cellulosic ethanol production, according to the EPA’s own numbers.

Until this April there was zero commercial production of cellulosic ethanol, when 20,000 gallons were produced.

So, again, we ask: who is being unreasonable? The EPA who somehow still maintains that 8.65 million gallons will be produced in 2012? Or the American Petroleum Institute? Even if the API requested that the blending requirement be reduced to zero, their final guess will be much closer to reality than the estimate of the EPA.

The worst drought in 50 years has destroyed one-sixth of the U.S. corn crop. The USDA’s World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WSDE) report, released Friday, projects the smallest corn crop in six years and the lowest corn yields per acre since 1995.

As acreage, production, and yields declined, corn prices spiked. Last week, corn futures hit a record high of $8.29-3/4 per bushel.

If corn prices remain  high through 2013, livestock producers who use corn as a feedstock will incur billions of dollars in added costs. “These additional costs will either be passed on to consumers through increased food prices, or poultry farmers will be forced out of business,” warn the National Chicken Council and National Turkey Federation.

Even before the drought hit, corn prices were high. Prices increased from $2.00 a bushel in 2005/2006 to $6.00 a bushel in 2011/2012, notes FarmEcon LLC. A key inflationary factor is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), commonly known as the ethanol mandate. Since 2005, the RFS has required more and more billions of bushels to be used to fuel cars rather than feed livestock and people.

Suspension of the mandate would allow meat, poultry, and dairy producers to compete on a level playing field with ethanol producers for what remains of the drought-ravaged crop. That would reduce corn prices, benefiting livestock producers and consumers alike.

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has authority under the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) to waive the RFS blending targets, in whole or in part, if she determines that those requirements “would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States.” The pressure on her to do so is mounting.

On July 30, a coalition of meat, dairy, and poultry producers petitioned Jackson to waive the 2012 and 2013 RFS blending requirements. From the petition:

As detailed below, the extraordinary and disastrous circumstances created for livestock and poultry producers by the ongoing drought in the heart of our grain growing regions requires that all relevant measures of relief be explored and taken where possible. One of these measures must be the amount of grain utilized for the production of renewable fuel. The ongoing drought is taking an enormous toll on the nation’s corn crop. As we detail below, the 15.2 billon gallon  renewable fuel standard (“RFS”) in 2012 coupled with the prospect of a 16.55 billion gallon standard in 2013 will require the renewable fuels industry to utilize a major portion of the drought-limited available corn supply. The drought-induced reductions in the corn supply means that the mandated utilization of corn for renewable fuels will so reduce the supply of corn and increase its price that livestock and poultry producers will be forced to reduce the size of their herds and flocks, causing some to go out of business and jobs to be lost. In addition to this direct harm, these herd and flock reductions will ripple through the meat, milk and poultry sectors, causing severe harm in the form of more job and economic losses. This drought-induced harm exists now, will continue to exist into the latter part of 2012 and 2013, and could continue to be felt in 2014 depending on the policy choices made now.

On August 1, bi-partisan groups of 156 House Members  and 26 Senators sent letters to Jackson asking her to “adjust” the RFS targets in light of the drought and rising corn prices. The House letter argues, in part:

As you are aware, U.S. corn prices have consistently risen, and the corn market has been increasingly volatile, since expansion of the RFS in 2007. This reflects the reality that approximately 40 percent of the corn crop now goes into ethanol production, a dramatic rise since the first ethanol mandates were put in place in 2005. Ethanol now consumes more corn than animal agriculture, a fact directly attributable to the federal mandate. While the government cannot control the weather, it fortunately has one tool still available that can directly impact corn demand. By adjusting the normally rigid Renewable Fuel Standard to align with current market conditions, the federal government can help avoid a dangerous economic situation because of the prolonged record high cost of corn.

 On August 9, Secretary General of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Jose Graziano da Silva called for an “immediate, temporary suspension” of the mandate  to help avert a repeat of the 2008 food crisis.

Also on August 9, the Govs. of Delaware (Jack Markell) and Maryland (Martin O’Malley), both Democrats, sent Jackson a letter in support of the industry coalition’s petition. From the Governors’ letter to Jackson:

In 2012, more than 40% of the U.S. annual corn supply was to be used to meet the RFS corn based ethanol requirements established annually by the EPA. If you were to exercise your statutory authority to waive the RFS standards for the next year, it would make more than 5 billion bushels of corn available to the marketplace for animal feed and foodstuffs, driving down costs and significantly lessening the financial impact to Delmarva’s [Delaware-Maryland-Virginia] poultry farms and consumers. While there may be some who question the true price impact of waiving the RFS standards for a limited period, those debates are quantitative, not qualitative, as it is not in dispute that a waiver would put downward pressure on corn pricing. Given the likely impacts to the poultry industry, not to mention the increased cost of food for consumers, of this dramatic increase in price due to the undersupply of corn, it is hard to imagine any scenario when exercising your authority would be more appropriate.

There is, alas, little chance Jackson will waive any part of the RFS. That would be asking an executive agency to put economic rationality ahead of political calculation in a presidential election year. President Obama today makes his fifth visit to Iowa this year. Iowa, with six electoral votes, is the heart of corn country. Supporting a waiver to lower corn prices would spoil the President’s photo ops.

Today’s Greenwire (subscription required) reports that the USDA has announced it will purchase up to $170 million worth of meat, poultry, and catfish to help producers who have been adversely affected by high corn prices. The fix on offer is not to scale back regulatory excess but to expand corporate welfare.  

The question answers itself. Of course not. But that is the effect of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), more commonly known as the ethanol mandate.

Under the RFS (Energy Independence and Security Act, p. 31), refiners must sell specified amounts of biofuel each year. The “volumetric targets” increase from 4.0 billion gallons in 2006 to 36 billion gallons in 2022. The amount of corn ethanol qualifying as “renewable” maxes out at 15 billion gallons in 2015. Already, ethanol production consumes about 40% of the annual U.S. corn crop.

By 2022, 21 billion gallons are to be “advanced” (low-carbon) biofuels, of which 16 billion gallons are to be made from plant cellulose. But with cellulosic ethanol proving to be a complete dud, corn growners and ethanol producers are lobbying to redefine corn ethanol as ”advanced.” If they succeed, mandatory sales of corn ethanol could significantly exceed 15 billion gallons annually.

In any event, the RFS sets aside a large and increasing quantity of the U.S. corn crop each year for ethanol production regardless of market demand for competing uses — and heedless of the potential impacts on food prices and world hunger. No matter how much of the U.S. corn crop is ruined by drought, no matter how high corn prices get, no matter how many people in developing countries are imperiled, the RFS requires that billions of bushels of corn be used to fuel cars rather than feed livestock and people. This is crazy.

Corn futures hit their all-time high this week, exceeding $8.00 per bushel. Soybean prices are also at record levels. More than 1 billion of the world’s people live in absolute poverty (defined as an income of less than $1.25 per day). When prices for staple commodities soar, millions of people can be pushed to the brink of starvation.

As noted yesterday on this blog, simply adding some flexibility to the RFS, so that the volumetric targets automatically scale back whenever corn reserves fall below critical thresholds, could help alleviate the surge in grain prices. Predictably, the corn lobby and USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack oppose this modest reform.

Even if made more flexible, the RFS would still flout a bedrock principle of our constitutional system: equality under law. Why as a matter of law should ethanol producers get first dibs on the U.S. corn crop? Why should their interest legally trump that of every other industry and consumer affected by corn prices? Why should they have a legal privilege to jump to the front of the line ahead of meat, poultry, and dairy producers, or those who export grain to hunger-stricken countries?

The ethanol lobby claims the RFS does not limit the availability of corn for other uses. The numbers indicate otherwise. As corn use for ethanol increased from 1.6 billion bushels in 2005/2006 to 5.0 billion in 2011/2012, use of corn for feed declined from 6.2 billion to an estimated 4.6 billion bushels, and corn exports declined from 2.1 billion to an estimated 1.7 billion bushels (FarmEcon LLC report, p. 19). The RFS turns a large and growing share of a major commodity into the exclusive preserve of one industry. This is not the American way.

Today, FarmEcon LLC released RFS, Fuel and Food Prices, and the Need for Statutory Flexibility, a study of ethanol’s impact on food and fuel prices. FarmEcon prepared the study for the American Meat Institute, California Dairies Inc., Milk Producers Council, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, National Chicken Council, National Pork Producers Council, and National Turkey Federation.

The study argues that the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), commonly known as the ethanol mandate, is detrimental to both non-ethanol industry corn users and food and fuel consumers. The program should therefore be reformed. The RFS has “destabilized corn and ethanol prices by offering an almost risk-free demand volume guaranty to the corn-based ethanol industry.” Consequently, food producers who use corn as a feedstock “have been forced to bear a disproportionate share of market and price risk” when corn yields fall and prices rise. This has become painfully obvious in recent weeks as drought conditions in the Midwest depress yields and push corn prices to record highs.

Appropriate reform* would assure food producers ”automatic market access” to corn stocks “in the event of a natural disaster and a sharp reduction in corn production.” Ethanol producers should “bear the burden of market adjustments, along with domestic food producers and corn export customers.” The study also recommends that the RFS schedule ”be revised to reflect the ethanol industry’s inability to produce commercially viable cellulosic fuels.”

Pretty tame stuff. An argument for flexibility to avoid the RFS’s worst market distortions and the cellulosic farce rather than an abolitionist manifesto. Nonetheless, the study paints a fairly damning picture of the RFS as a whole:

• Increases in ethanol production since 2007 have made little, or no, contribution to U.S. energy supplies, or dependence on foreign crude oil. Rather, those increases have pushed gasoline suplies into the export market.
• Current ethanol policy has increased and destabilized corn and related commodity prices to the detriment of both food and fuel producers. Corn price volatility has more than doubled since 2007.
• Following the late 2007 increase in the RFS, food price inflation relative to all other goods and services accelerated sharply to twice its 2005-2007 rate.
• Post-2007 higher rates of food price inflation are associated with sharp increases in corn, soybean and wheat prices.
• On an energy basis, ethanol has never been priced competitively with gasoline.
• Ethanol production costs and prices have ruled out U.S. ethanol use at levels higher than E10. As a result, we exported 1.2 billion gallons of ethanol in 2011.
• Due to its higher energy cost and negative effect on fuel mileage, ethanol adds to the overall cost of motor fuels. In 2011 the higher cost of ethanol energy compared to gasoline added approximately $14.5 billion, or about 10 cents per gallon, to the cost of U.S. gasoline consumption. Ethanol tax credits (since discontinued) added another 4 cents per gallon.

Some other key points presented in the study:

• Ethanol typically sells for less per gallon than gasoline, but “engines do not run on gallons, they run on energy,” and a gallon of ethanol has only 67% of the net energy in a gallon of gasoline.
• Consequently, on a per-mile basis, ethanol is more expensive than gasoline. This accounts for the failure of E85 (motor fuel blended with 85% ethanol) to achieve significant sales. ”According to recent Department of Energy statistics, ethanol blends of more than 55 percent account for only 2,000 barrels per week out of total gasoline production of about 8.7 million barrels per week.”
• The RFS has dramatically altered U.S. corn markets. Corn prices have increased from $2.00 a bushel in 2005/2006 to $6.00 a bushel in 2011/2012. Corn use for ethanol increased from 1.6 billion bushels in 2005/2006 to 5.0 billion in 2011/2012. Feed use of corn declined from 6.2 billion bushels in 2005/2006 to an estimated 4.6 billion in 2011/2012. Corn exports declined from 2.1 billion bushels in 2005/2006 to an estimated 1.7 billion bushels in 2011/2012.
• The RFS creates risks as well as benefits for ethanol producers. “Since the first RFS schedule in 2005, the corn cost in a gallon of ethanol has increased from about 50 percent to more than 80 percent of total ethanol production costs. Corn costs for ethanol producers have also been much more volatile. . . .This higher volatility [after the 2007 RFS] has increased business risks for all corn users. The result has been the bankruptcy of a number of ethanol companies and food producers.”
• Corn is a key commodity used by meat, poultry, and dairy producers. Corn prices also influence wheat, soybeans, and other commodities, because corn competes with those crops for customers and/or land. The cost of corn, wheat, and soybeans used in U.S. food production has risen from $26.5 billion in 2005, when the first RFS was enacted, to $69.5 billion in 2011. “The cumulative cost increase over 2005-2011 was $141.9 billion.” Higher energy prices also played a significant role. Nonetheless, the RFS mandates were an important factor.
• The cost of food has increased much faster than overall inflation since the 2007 RFS was enacted. “Overall price inflation of items other than food, even including energy, declined dramatically after December, 2007. The decrease was largely due to the 2008-2009 recession. In 2005 to 2007, food prices were increasing slower than all items other than food. However, post-RFS food price inflation accelerated, even in the face of the recession.”
• “Higher corn prices (and associated increases in wheat and soybean prices) have dramatically raised the costs of producing meat and poultry.” Unspurprisingly, per capita meat and poultry consumption “has declined to the lowest level since 1990.”
• Like the MIT study I reviewed earlier this week, the FarmEcon study rejects the ‘finding’ of Iowa State University researchers that ethanol, by expanding the U.S. motor fuel supply, reduced the crack spread (refiner profit margin) by $1.09 per gallon in 2011, sparing consumers an equivalent increase in pain at the pump.
• FarmEcon offers a critique based on statistical models but also presents an Econ 101 argument: “The 2000-2011 average gasoline crack price spread was 27.8 cents per gallon. The 2011 margin averaged 37.1 cents. A $1.09 increase in that margin would lead to refineries quickly increasing gasoline production and reducing gasoline exports. The increase in gasoline supply available to the U.S. market would largely, likely entirely, wipe out the higher gasoline price.” In other words, the market is self-correcting. Refiners don’t need big-daddy government to tell them to produce more fuel when demand increases faster than supply and prices rise.

* The reform examined in the study, proposed by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), would relax the RFS targets as the corn stocks-to-use ratio declines below 10%. Stocks-to-use measures the quantity (“stock”) of a commodity at the end of a particular time period as a percentage of total use of the commodity during that time period. TradingCharts.Com explains how a stocks-to-use ratio is calculated.

The stocks to use ratio indicates the level of carryover stock for any given commodity as a percentage of the total demand or use. The mathematical formula for this relationship is as follows:

 Beginning Stock + Total Production – Total Use ÷ Total Use

. . . . beginning stocks represent the previous year’s ending or carryover inventories. Total production represents the total grain produced in a given year. Total usage is the sum of all the end uses in which the stock of grain has been consumed. This would include human consumption, export programs, seed, waste, dockage and feed consumption. By adding carry-over stocks to the total production you will obtain the total supply. From the total supply, subtract the total use and the resultant figure will be the year ending carryover stock. The carryover stock divided by the total usage can be expressed as a ratio which when compared with previous years gives the market analyst an indication of the relative supply/demand balance for a particular commodity. This ratio can then be used to indicate whether current and projected stock levels are critical or plentiful.The ratio can also be used to indicate how many days of supply are available to the world marketplace under current usage patterns ( eg. a 20% stocks to use ratio for wheat indicates that there are 75 days supply of wheat in reserve).

TradingCharts.Com notes that historical stocks-to-use data provide “bench mark ratios” useful for predicting movements in commodity prices: “On a world basis a stocks/use ratio for wheat under 20% has typically led to strong price advances. For corn, the comparable number appears to be under 12% . For soybeans, the critical level is below 10%.”

The Goodlatte proposal adjusts the RFS targets as follows:

• No reduction in the mandated quantity of renewable fuel if corn stocks-to-use is above 10%;
• a 10% reduction if stocks-to-use is 10.0%-7.5%;
• a 15% reduction if stocks-to-use is 7.49%-6.0%;
• a 25% reduction if stocks-to-use is 5.99%-5.0%; and,
• a 50% reduction if stocks-to-use is below 5%.

According to FarmEcon, corn stocks-to-use in 2010/2011 was 6.2% and in 2011/2012 is 6.7%. In both crop years, the RFS target would be reduced by 15% under Goodlatte’s proposal.