Do biofuel mandates and subsidies inflate food prices? Do they increase world hunger ? There was a rip-roaring debate on the food security impacts of biofuel policies in 2007-2008, when sharp spikes in wheat, corn, and rice prices imperiled an estimated 100 million people in developing countries. Food price riots broke out in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen.

Experts attributed the rapid rise in food prices to several factors including high petroleum prices, drought in Australia, a weak U.S. dollar, commodity speculation, and rising demand for grain-fed meat by China’s rapidly expanding middle class. But some also laid part of the blame on biofuel policies, which artificially increase global demand for corn and soy while diverting those crops and farmland from food to fuel production. A July 2008 World Bank report argued that biofuel policies accounted for as much as two-thirds of the 2007-2008 price spike. A July 2010 World Bank report, on the other hand, concluded that rising petroleum prices were the dominant factor. “Biofuels played some role too, but much less than previously thought,” the report stated.

Where does the debate stand today? Recent reports by the National Research Council (NRC), the New England Complex Systems Institute (CSI), the UN Committee on World Food Security (CWFS), and Iowa State University (ISU) all acknowledge that biofuel policies put upward pressure on food and feed prices. The NRC and ISU studies argue that U.S. biofuel policies have only modest impacts on grain prices whereas the CSI and CWFS studies indicate that biofuel policies contributed significantly to the 2008 global food crisis and/or pose significant risks to global food security today.

Links to these reports and key excerpts follow.

National Research Council, Renewable Fuel Standard: Potential Economic and Environmental Effects of U.S. Biofuel Policy (2011):

Food-based biofuel is one of many factors that contributed to upward price pressure on agricultural commodities, food, and livestock feed since 2007; other factors affecting those prices included growing population overseas, crop failures in other countries, high oil prices, decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, and speculative activity in the marketplace.

To date, the agricultural commodities most affected by U.S. biofuels production are corn and soybean. The increased competition for these commodities created by an expanding biofuels market has contributed to upward pressure on their prices, but the increase has had a small effect on consumers’ food retail prices, except livestock products, because corn and soybean typically undergo some processing before reaching consumers’ food basket. The difference between the price of an unprocessed commodity and the retail price of processed food is typically large. The committee estimated that an increase of 20-40 percent in agricultural commodity prices would result in an increase in the retail price of most processed grocery food products (for example, breakfast cereal and bread) containing those commodities of only 1 to 2 percent.

New England Complex Systems Institute, Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion (September 2011):

We further systematically consider other proposed factors affecting food prices. We provide quantitative evidence excluding all of them from playing a major role in recent price changes except corn to ethanol conversion. We show that, aside from the high price peaks, the underlying trends of increasing food prices match the increases in the rate of ethanol conversion.

Only a small fraction of the production of corn before 2000, corn ethanol consumed a remarkable 40% of US corn crops in 2011, promoted by US government subsidies based upon the objective of energy independence, and advocacy by industry groups. Corn serves a wide variety of purposes in the food supply system and therefore has impact across the food market. Corn prices also a ect the price of other crops due to substitutability at the consumer end and competition for land at the production end.

Regulation of markets and government subsidies to promote corn to ethanol conversion have distorted the existing economic allocation by diverting food to energy use. This raised equilibrium prices, increased energy supply by a small fraction (US corn ethanol accounted for less than 1% of US energy consumption in 2009 and reduced grain for food by a much larger one (US corn used for ethanol production is 4.3% of the total world grain production, even after allowing for the feed byproduct.

A parsimonious explanation that accounts for food price change dynamics over the past seven years can be based upon only two factors: speculation and corn to ethanol conversion. We can attribute the sharp peaks in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 to speculation, and the underlying upward trend to biofuels. The impact of changes in all other factors is small enough to be neglected in comparison to these effects.

UN Committee on World Food Security Security, A Report by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, Price volatility and food security (July 2011):

Biofuel support policies in the United States and the European Union have created a demand shock that is widely considered to be one of the major causes of the international food price rise of 2007/08.

By generating a new demand for food commodities that can outbid poor countries and food-insecure populations, industrial biofuels highlight the tension between a potentially unlimited demand (in this case for energy) and the constraints of a world with finite resources. Several proposals linked to changes in existing mandates could reduce the likelihood of biofuel production contributing to price spikes.

Given the major roles played by biofuels in diverting food to energy use, the CFS should demand of governments the abolition of targets on biofuels and the removal of subsidies and tariffs on biofuel production and processing.

Bruce A. Babcock, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, The Impact of U.S. Biofuel Policies on Agricultural Price Levels and Volatility (June 2011):

It is indisputable that biofuels contribute to higher agricultural commodity prices because the biofuel industry represents a large and growing share of demand for maize, vegetable oil and sugarcane. But biofuel production levels are not driven solely by government subsidies. Biofuels are the only large-scale substitute for liquid transportation fuels, so when crude oil prices rise, so too does the demand for biofuels. Furthermore, high agricultural commodity prices are not caused solely by expanded biofuel demand.

. . . a large expansion in US ethanol production would have occurred even if the subsidies and mandates had not been in place. The reason is that the return on investment in ethanol would have been so high that investors still would have brought their capital to the industry. As shown, the model indicates that in 2009, ethanol production would have been about 1.2 billion gallons lower without subsidies. The largest difference in production would have been in the 2008 marketing year when subsidies increased ethanol production by more than 2.3 billion gallons.

Market-based expansion of ethanol contributed about 50 percent to the difference in maize prices between 2004 and 2009. The direct conclusion of these results is that ethanol subsidies have had little impact on crop prices and that market-based expansion of ethanol had a large impact on maize prices, a modest impact on wheat prices and practically no impact on soybean and rice prices over this time period.

Overall, these results indicate that the effects of both ethanol subsidies and market-driven expansion of ethanol on US food prices have been small.

I may comment further on these reports in a future post. In the meantime, I will simply observe that if Babcock is correct, and U.S. biofuel policies have only a small influence on food prices because “a large expansion in US ethanol production would have occurred even if the subsidies and mandates had not been in place,” then U.S. taxpayers get little or no energy-security bang for billions of biofuel bucks.

As former OMB analyst Ken Glozer, author of Corn Ethanol: Who Pays, Who Benefits? explains in an op-ed based on his book:

The costs of ethanol policies are enormous, estimated at more than $500 billion to American consumers and taxpayers from 2008 to 2017. The taxpayer costs include subsidies to corn growers and for ethanol production.

The EIA forecast shows that current federal ethanol policy produces a minuscule additional amount of ethanol over what would be produced using a competitive market policy in the foreseeable future. In 2010, a mere 600 million gallons of additional ethanol were produced, roughly 5 percent of the 13 billion total gallons produced. In 2015, federal policies will increase production by just 1.4 billion gallons. The latter is less than 1 percent of U.S. gasoline consumption, and the cost per barrel of petroleum import reduction is an astounding $2,171.

From Glozer’s book:

The Senate is expected to vote on S. 520, a bill to repeal the 45 cents per gallon volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC). The bill is co-sponsored by Sens. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) and Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.). Sens. Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Jim Webb (D-Va.) have also introduced S. 530, which would limit the VEETC to “advanced biofuels,” thus ending the subsidy for conventional corn ethanol. S. 530 would also scale back the 54 cents per gallon ethanol import tariff commensurately with the reduction in the tax credit.

The VEETC adds about $6 billion annually to the federal deficit. Unlike many other tax credits that reduce a household’s or a business’s tax liability, the VEETC is a “refundable” tax credit. That means the VEETC is literally paid for out of the U.S. general fund with checks written by the Treasury Department. The protective tariff, for its part, prevents lower-priced Brazilian ethanol from competing in U.S. markets. It increases the price of motor fuel at the pump.

Now, you would think supporting S. 520 and S. 530 would be a no-brainer for conservative lawmakers. But some are reportedly getting cold feet. To remind them of their duty to put the general interest of consumers and taxpayers ahead of the special interest of King Corn, I offer the following observations.

(1) The market for ethanol is propped up by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), a Soviet-style production quota. Conservatives should be appalled by this reversion to Stalin-era central planning. Should taxpayers have to subsidize ethanol too?

(2) The Ethanol Troika – RFS, VEETC, Protective Tariff – increases consumers’ pain at the pump. Because the supply of ethanol, ramped up by the Troika, exceeds demand, ethanol today is cheaper than gasoline by volume. However, ethanol has one-third less energy than an equivalent volume of gasoline. Thus, consumers have to spend more for ethanol than gasoline to drive the same number of miles. The American Automobile Association’s Daily Fuel Gauge Report makes this crystal clear by publishing the mileage-adjusted price of E-85 (motor fuel blended with 85% ethanol). Here is today’s report:

(3) EPA and the Department of Transportion also know that ethanol policies increase consumers’ pain at the pump, although you have to dig deep into their joint Web site, www.fueleconomy.gov, to find the information. If you go to the site, click on Alternative Fuel Vehicles, then on Flexible Fuel Vehicles, then on Fuel Economy Information on Flexible Fuel Vehicles, and then on Go, you finally come to a page comparing how much an average consumer would have to spend annually to fill up each of more than 100 flex-fuel vehicles with regular gasoline and E-85. In every case, the consumer pays about $40-$70 more to fill up with E-85. Only a few months ago, when gasoline prices were lower, E-85 customers had to spend $200-$300 more per year. Obvious question for conservative lawmakers: If ethanol is such a great bargain for consumers, why do we need a law to make us buy it?

(4) The VEETC is a huge taxpayer rip-off. Analyses by the University of Missouri Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, Iowa State University (in the heart of corn country), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) find that the mandate chiefly determines how much ethanol is produced over the next five years. The VEETC and tariff support only a small and declining fraction of total production.

• According to the University of Missouri study, the VEETC will induce an additional 1.4 billion gallons of ethanol to be blended above the 12.6 billion gallons already required by law this year. With the VEETC costing nearly $6 billion, that works out to about $4 for each “extra” gallon of ethanol. When gasoline hit $4.00 a gallon in the summer of 2008, politicians denounced gas prices as “obscene.”
• The actual per gallon cost of the VEETC may be even higher. The Iowa State study estimates that extending the VEETC would induce additional blending of 680 million gallons of ethanol, costing taxpayers almost $7.00 per extra gallon in 2011. In 2014, the VEETC would induce additional blending of only 220 million gallons. That works out to a whopping $30.40 per gallon!

(5) As climate policy, the VEETC is a complete bust.

• Again, the VEETC and tariff support only a small and declining fraction of total production. Consequently, any incremental greenhouse gas reduction attributable to those policies has an unreasonably high price tag. CBO estimates that the VEETC costs taxpayers $750 to $1700 for every ton of greenhouse gases avoided — many times the estimated price of emission permits under the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill, which the Senate did not see fit to pass.
• Ironically, the corn rush may increase net greenhouse gas emissions, as Tim Searchinger of Princeton University and Joe Fargione of the Nature Conservancy found in separate studies. A gallon of ethanol emits less carbon dioxide (CO2) than a gallon of gasoline when combusted. However, CO2-emitting fossil fuels are used to make fertilizer, operate farm equipment, power ethanol distilleries, and transport the ethanol to market. In addition, when farmers plow grasslands and clear forests to expand corn acreage, or to grow food crops displaced elsewhere by energy crop production, they release carbon previously locked up in soils and trees. For several decades, such land use changes can generate more CO2 than is avoided by substituting ethanol for gasoline.
• Unsurprisingly, many environmental groups and even Al Gore have disavowed their previous support for corn ethanol. Isn’t it time for conservatives to outgrow this obsolete environmental fad?

(6) Corn ethanol does squat for U.S. energy security. Former OMB analyst Ken Glozer demolishes the energy-security rationale for ethanol subsidies in Corn Ethanol: Who Pays, Who Benefits (April 2011), published by the conservative Hoover Institution.

The chart below comes from Glozer’s recent briefing at the Heritage Foundation. It shows that the Troika increases annual corn ethanol production by only 5.2 billion gallons in 2015. When that is adjusted for ethanol’s lower energy content, it means ethanol will displace only 1.8% of total U.S. oil imports in 2015. Even that may be an exaggeration, because it does not factor in all the petroleum used to operate farm machinery, fertilize the corn crops, and deliver the ethanol to market. So at best, taxpayers would be on the hook for $30 billion from 2010-2015 to reduce petroleum imports by 1.8%. When we also consider that Canada and Mexico are the two largest sources of U.S. oil imports, it’s obvious that the energy security benefit of that $30 billion investment is symbolism without substance, even if one views oil imports with alarm.*

* In The Energy Security Obsession, Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren of the Cato Institute argue that “worries about [oil] producer blackmail are only a bit less far-fetched than worries about an alien invasion.” They also find no evidence of a relationship between Saudi oil profits and the number or lethality of Islamic terrorist incidents.