Today on National Journal’s Energy Experts Blog, I post a comment celebrating the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) as a triumph of centralized economic planning. You think I’m joking? Far from it. The RFS is working at least as well as other central planning schemes!

Well, okay, the RFS would be funny if it weren’t so destructive. A new report by NERA Economic Consulting warns that the RFS is heading for a “death spiral” — a vicious circle in which rising fuel costs, declining sales, and dwindling biofuel credits make compliance increasingly “infeasible.”

In one scenario analyzed by NERA, the death spiral produces a 30% increase in gasoline prices and a 300% increase in the cost of diesel fuel in 2015. Potential adverse macroeconomic impacts include a “$770 billion decline in GDP and a corresponding reduction in consumption per household of $2,700.” Ludwig von Mises coined a term for such debacles: “Planned Chaos.”

Last week, Reps. Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) released the first White Paper in a series intended to help policymakers and the public review the RFS in light of the “wealth of implementation experience” accumulated over the past five years.

After poking fun at the mandate’s glorious achievements, my post concludes:

In all seriousness, Reps. Upton and Waxman are to be commended for launching a reassessment of the RFS. The exercise will be most valuable if policymakers gain a new sense of modesty about their ability to design markets and direct the future of economic evolution.

“U.S. EPA has altered its cellulosic biofuel requirements for 2012 — from 8.65 million gallons to zero,” today’s Climatewire reports. In January, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated EPA’s 2012 cellulosic biofuels standard. “As a result,” Climatewire explains, ”obligated parties — oil companies required to show EPA that they blend biofuels in their fuel supply — won’t need to provide information on their compliance. The agency will submit refunds to companies that have submitted payments for 2012 cellulosic waiver credits.”

Who says there’s no justice in this world! For several years the EPA has fined refiners for not purchasing and blending ethanol made from switchgrass, wood chips, and other fibrous, non-edible plants. Refiners protested that there was no commercial cellulosic fuel to buy. The EPA argued that didn’t matter because the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is meant to be “technology forcing.” The agency thus based each year’s cellulosic target on aspirational (rather than realistic) projections of how much cellulosic fuel would be produced. It then cheerfully collected fines for all the gallons of phantom fuel refiners did not blend.

The Court held that punishing refiners for what the ethanol industry failed to do is not “technology forcing”:

EPA applies the pressure to one industry (the refiners) [citation omitted], yet it is another (the producers of cellulosic biofuel) that enjoys the requisite expertise, plant, capital and ultimate opportunity for profit. Apart from their role as captive consumers, the refiners are in no position to ensure, or even contribute to, growth in the cellulosic biofuel industry. “Do a good job, cellulosic fuel producers. If you fail, we’ll fine your customers.” Given this asymmetry in incentives, EPA’s projection is not “technology-forcing” in the same sense as other innovation-minded regulations that we have upheld.

Zeroing out the RFS cellulosic blending targets established by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) is long overdue. EISA (p. 32) required refiners to sell 100 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol in 2010, 250 million gallons in 2011, and 500 million gallons in 2012. Because hoped-for breakthroughs did not occur, the EPA dumbed down the mandated quantities to 6.5 million gallons in 2010, 6.0 million in 2011, and 8.65 million in 2012. However, even those symbolic targets were unattainable. In 2012, the U.S. biofuel industry produced only 20,069 gallons of cellulosic ethanol, according to Climatewire. As of early 2013, no commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol plants exist.

How come? The ethanol industry is quick to blame others. Supposedly, the E10 blend wall — the EPA policy that, until June 2012, limited to 10% the amount of ethanol permitted in a gallon of gasoline – allowed corn ethanol to saturate the market and crowd out demand for cellulosic fuel. Supposedly also, political attacks on the RFS have created uncertainty about the future of government policy, scaring away investors. Whether or not these factors play some role, the chief barrier to commercialization is cost.

In an article about BP’s recent cancelation of a $350 million cellulosic plant in Highlands County, Florida, MIT Technology Review editor Kevin Bullis observes:

Economists have recently done field studies to determine just how much the feedstocks—the grasses, wood chips, straw, or corn stover—actually cost to grow, harvest, and get to a biofuels plant. Whereas early estimates—the ones that helped spur the cellulosic ethanol mandates—put the cost at $30 a ton, the actual costs are more like $80 to $130 a ton. That means the grass and wood chips required to make a gallon of ethanol will cost $1.30 to $1.48—even before anything is done to process them. (For context, the price of a gallon of processed ethanol made from corn is now $2.40 a gallon.)

Based on the cost for plants like the one BP proposed in Florida, the cost could be 10 times higher for a cellulosic plant than a corn ethanol one, at least for the first plants, says Wallace Tyner, a professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University.

Responding to the anti-Renewable Fuel Standard Hill briefing discussed on this blog yesterday, Tom Buis, CEO of ethanol trade group Growth Energy, asserted that “homegrown American renewable energy provides consumers with a choice and savings” (Greenwire, subscription required). Rubbish. Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), ethanol consumption is a mandate, not a choice. 

Buis’s claim that ethanol relieves pain at the pump sounds plausible because a gallon of ethanol is cheaper than a gallon of gasoline. However, ethanol has about one-third less energy than gasoline and does not make up the difference in price. Consequently, the higher the ethanol blend, the worse mileage your car gets, and the more money you spend to drive a given distance.

FuelEconomy.Gov, a Web site jointly administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) calculates how much a typical motorist would spend in a year to fill up a flex-fuel vehicle with either E85 (motor fuel made with 85% ethanol) or regular gasoline. The exact bottom line changes as gasoline and ethanol prices change. The big picture, though, is always the same: Ethanol is a net money loser for the consumer.

For example, at prices prevailing in late November 2012, it cost $500 more per year to drive on E85. When I checked FuelEconomy.Gov last week, E85 cost the average motorist an additional $600 per year.

A bad deal just got worse. At today’s prices, it would cost an extra $700-$900 a year to switch from regular gasoline to E85. Some savings! Small wonder that our ‘choice’ to buy ethanol must be mandated.

This morning I attended a briefing on “The Renewable Fuel Standard: Pitfalls, Challenges, and the Need for Congressional Action in 2013.” Steve Ellis of Taxpayers for Common Sense moderated a panel of six experts. Although each expert spotlighted a different set of harms arising from the RFS, reflecting the core concern of his or her organization, this was a team effort, with panelists frequently affirming each other’s key points. Collectively, they made a strong case that the RFS is a “costly failure.” The briefing’s purpose was to demonstrate the need for reform rather than outline a specific reform agenda. Panelists nonetheless agreed that, at a minimum, Congress should scale back the RFS blending targets for corn ethanol.

Kristin Sundell of ActionAid explained how the RFS exacerbates world hunger, undermining U.S. foreign aid and international security objectives. The RFS diverts 15% of the world corn supply from food to fuel, putting upward pressure on food prices. A recent Tufts University study estimates that U.S. ethanol expansion during the past 6 years cost developing countries more than $5.5 billion in higher prices for corn imports. In Guatemala, the additional expense ($28 million) in 2011 effectively cancelled out all U.S. food aid and agricultural assistance for that year. Food price spikes, partly due to the RFS, were a factor in the recent turmoil in the Middle East. ”Congress can’t control the weather, but they can control misguided energy policies that could cause a global food crisis,” Sundell said.

Kristin Wilcox of the American Frozen Food Institute discussed the RFS’s impact on food consumers. Corn is both the chief animal feed and an ingredient in about 75% of all frozen foods. Consequently, RFS-induced increases in corn prices drive up “the cost of producing a wide range of foods and leads to higher food bills for consumers.” In addition, when corn prices go up, so do the prices of other commodities that compete with corn such as wheat and soybeans. ”Our position is very simple,” Wilcox said: “food should be used to fuel bodies, not vehicle engines.” She concluded: “Trying to change the price at the pump should not burden consumers with increased prices in the grocery check out aisle.”

Actually, as Geoff Moody of the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers pointed out, the RFS aggravates rather than alleviates pain at the pump. Graphs from the Energy Information Administration show that biofuels are more expensive than gasoline on an energy-content (per-mile) basis. The higher the ethanol blend, the more expensive it is to drive, which is why fewer than 4% of flex-fuel vehicle owners fill up with E85 (motor fuel blended with 85% ethanol).

Moody’s major point was that the RFS is becoming increasingly unworkable. Already the 135 billion gallon U.S. motor fuel market is nearly saturated with E10. By 2022, U.S. motor fuel consumption is projected to be about 25% lower than Congress assumed when it expanded the RFS in 2007. If Congress does not revise the RFS, refiners will have to sell E20 or higher, but the existing retail infrastructure is not equipped to handle blends higher than E10. A typical service station may clear a profit of only $45,000 on motor fuel sales, but replacing pumps and storage tanks to handle higher blends can cost $50,000 to $200,000.

Scott Faber of the Environmental Working Group discussed the RFS program’s environmental impacts, especially changes in land use. From 2008 to 2011, high crop prices and crop subsidies contributed to the conversion of 23 million acres of wetlands and grasslands, an area the size of Indiana. About 8.4 million acres were converted to corn production. “We have lost more wetlands and grasslands in the last four years than we have in the last 40 years,” Faber said. If lawmakers knew in 2007 what we now know about the RFS’s many serious unintended consequences, they would not have enacted the program, Faber opined.

Tom Elam of Farm Econ LLC discussed the RFS program’s impacts on livestock producers and meat and poultry consumers. Since Congress created the RFS in 2005, annual feed costs have increased by $8.8 billion for chicken producers and $1.9 billion for turkey producers. Consequences of those higher costs include an 8 billion pound decline in poultry production, eight major bankruptcies, a half billion dollar loss in farm income, and higher prices for consumers.

Retail broiler prices, for example, increased from $1.74/lb in 2005 to $1.97/lb in December 2012. Turkey prices similarly rose from $1.07/lb in 2005 to $1.80/lb in early 2012. Beef and pork prices too rose along with feed costs, with the result that U.S. per capita meat and poultry consumption declined by about 10% since 2008.

The RFS may be good for corn farmers, but it fosters economic inefficiency. For every $1 of added ethanol production, food production costs increased $2.89. In other words, food producers bear a cost “more than twice the value of the ethanol created.”

Jim Currie of the National Marine Manufacturers Association explained the perils of E15 to the $72 billion per year U.S. recreational boating industry. Boats and other small gasoline-powered engines are designed to run on motor fuels blended with 10% ethanol or less. Consequently, “anything above E10 poses serious problems, including performance issues like stalling, corrosion leading to oil or fuel leaks, increased emissions and damaged valves, rubber fuel lines and gaskets.”

Higher blends are trouble for two reasons. First, ethanol is a solvent and at increased concentrations eats away at engine components. Second, ethanol is an oxygenate, and the higher the oxygen content of a fuel, the hotter the burn. Tests supervised by the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Lab prove “time and time again that marine engines and, by extrapolation, other types of engines, simply cannot tolerate the high levels of additional oxygen that this fuel blend forces into the engine.” Currie presented lab test photos of such engine damage (pp. 3-7 of this Power Point).

Valve rupture from E15

Touching on the potential risks E15 poses to automobiles, he quoted the AAA’s statement of last December: “Only about 12 million out of the more than 240 million light-duty vehicles on the roads today are approved by manufacturers to use E15 gasoline.”

Currie’s conclusion drew applause from the Hill crowd:

As I am the last presenter today, let me offer a hypothetical scenario, based on what you have heard. Suppose an organization approached the Hill today and said, “We have a great idea for a new policy. It will largely benefit a small number of people in one part of the country, and members of Congress from there will support it wholeheartedly. The downside is that it will hurt the environment; and conservation practices; and will drive up food costs; and hurt people in developing countries; and will potentially damage every small engine in the country, including those in motorcycles and snowmobiles and ATVs and lawnmowers and generators; and it will damage boat engines; and it will potentially damage most automobile engines and will void your engine warranty if you use it. But we want you to enact a law requiring the American consumer to use it anyway.” That’s where we are today, and we think this law needs to be changed.

The Governors of Georgia, Texas, Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Carolina have petitioned EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to waive the mandatory ethanol blending requirements established by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The petitioners hope thereby to lower and stabilize corn prices, which recently hit record highs as the worst drought in 50 years destroyed one-sixth of the U.S. corn crop. Corn is the principal feedstock used in ethanol production.

Arkansas Gov. Mike Bebe’s letter to Administrator Jackson concisely makes the case for regulatory relief:

Virtually all of Arkansas is suffering from severe, extreme, or exceptional drought conditions. The declining outlook for this year’s corn crop and accelerating prices for corn and other grains are having a severe economic impact on the State, particularly on our poultry and cattle sectors. While the drought may have triggered the price spike in corn, an underlying cause is the federal policy mandating ever-increasing amounts corn for fuel. Because of this policy, ethanol production now consumes approximately 40 percent of the U.S. corn crop, and the cost of corn for use in food production has increased by 193 percent since 2005 [the year before the RFS took effect]. Put simply, ethanol policies have created significantly higher corn prices, tighter supplies, and increased volatility.

Agriculture is the backbone of Arkansas’s economy, accounting for nearly one-quarter of our economic activity. Broilers, turkeys, and cattle — sectors particularly vulnerable to this corn crisis — represent nearly half of Arkansas’s farm marketing receipts. Arkansas poultry operators are trying to cope with grain cost increases and cattle familes are struggling to feed their herds.

Section 211(o)(7) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes the EPA to waive all or part of the RFS blending targets for one year if the Administrator determines, after public notice and an opportunity for public comment, that implementation of those requirements would “severely harm” the economy of a State, a region, or the United States. Only once before has a governor requested an RFS waiver. When corn prices soared in 2008, Gov. Rick Perry of Texas requested that the EPA waive 50% of the mandate for the production of corn ethanol. Perry, writing in April 2008, noted that corn prices were up 138% globally since 2005. He estimated that rising corn prices had imposed a net loss on the State’s economy of $1.17 billion in 2007 and potentially could impose a net loss of $3.59 billion in 2008. At particular risk were the family ranches that made up two-thirds of State’s 149,000 cattle producers. Bush EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson rejected Perry’s petition in August 2008.

In the EPA’s Request for Comment on the 2012 waiver petitions, the agency indicates it will use the same “analytical approach” and “legal interpretation” on the basis of which Johnson denied Perry’s request in 2008. This means the regulatory decks are stacked against the petitioners. As the EPA reads the statute, CAA Section 211(o)(7) establishes a burden of proof that is nearly impossible for petitioners to meet. No matter how high corn prices get, or how serious the associated economic harm, the EPA will have ready-made excuses not to waive the corn-ethanol blending requirements.

According to the EPA, Petitioners must show that the “RFS itself” would cause severe economic harm, not merely “contribute” to it. Petitioners therefore must also show that the relief sought would achieve a substantial reduction in the prices of corn, feed, and food.

This reading of the statute effectively prejudges the issue. ”Severe” economic harm typically results from a combination of factors, not one single cause. An ethanol mandate that causes little economic harm when unemployment rates are low, corn production is high, and China’s demand for U.S. corn imports is low could inflict severe harm when the opposite conditions obtain — as they do today.

If Congress wanted the EPA to grant a waiver only when the RFS alone causes severe economic harm, it could have easily said so. The statute specifies no such limitation. CAA Section 211(o)(7) does not tell the EPA to ignore non-RFS factors that might also adversely affect food and feed prices, agricultural employment, and the competitiveness of U.S. livestock producers.

The EPA’s demand that the waiver be a ”remedy for the harm” is the flip side of this same trick coin. By law, the EPA may grant a waiver for only one year at a time. Although a series of waivers might provide a complete remedy, a one-year waiver may have little impact on markets shaped by the RFS’s 17-year (2006-2022) production quota schedule. So the EPA could reject the waiver petitions on the grounds that a piecemeal solution is no solution at all.

Note: The EPA argues the exact opposite when the issue is whether or not to pull a regulatory trigger. In such cases, even small contributions to an alleged harm are considered sufficient grounds for regulation, and even minute regulatory contributions to the hoped-for solution are deemed fully justified and legally required.

Take, for example, the EPA’s heavy-duty truck greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards. The EPA estimates that the standards for model year (MY) 2014-2018 heavy-duty vehicles will reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations by 0.732 parts per million, which in turn will avert an estimated 0.002-0.004°C of global warming and 0.012-0.048 centimeters of sea-level rise by the year 2100 (Proposed Heavy Truck Rule, p. 74289). Such changes would be too small for scientists to distinguish from the “noise” of inter-annual climate variability. The EPA acknowledges no obligation to demonstrate either that heavy-truck GHG emissions alone harm public health and welfare or that regulating MY 2014-2018 heavy-truck GHG emissions would have a major impact on global warming.

Consider also the EPA’s Utility MACT Rule for coal-fired power plants. The agency acknowledges that U.S. mercury (Hg) emissions constitute only 5% of global anthropogenic Hg emissions and only 2% of the total global Hg pool, and that U.S. power plant emissions account for only 0.6% of the global pool. More importantly, the EPA estimates  — based on dubious epidemiological evidence and questionable demographic modeling – that the MACT Rule’s Hg emission reductions will avert the loss of 0.00209 IQ points per child in a guesstimated population of 240,000 subsistence fishing households. IQ points cannot be measured out to five decimal places. The MACT Rule’s microscopic mercury-related health benefits are literally undetectable and unverifiable. The EPA is completely undaunted by such facts. In the agency’s words (Proposed Utility MACT Rule, p. 24978):

However, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted in decisions as recently as Massachusetts v. EPA, regarding the problem of climate change, it is not necessary to show that a problem will be entirely solved by the action being taken, nor that it is necessary to cure all ills before addressing those judged to be significant. 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007).

In stark contrast, when the issue before the EPA is whether to grant regulatory relief, then the regulation itself must be shown to cause severe harm, and even temporary relief must be shown to cure all ills (or most of them). This is not surprising. Being a regulatory agency, the EPA does not accord the harms of over-regulation the same weight as the harms of under-regulation.

So in all likelihood, the EPA will deny the Governors’ waiver requests, even though a waiver would undoubtedly lower and stabilize corn prices to some extent.

This cloud may have a silver lining. If the EPA once again refuses to balance the interests of corn farmers against those of other industries and consumers, it will furnish new evidence that the RFS is a policy disaster. Especially if the drought persists into 2013, an EPA that won’t heed the reasonable requests of domestic livestock producers, seven governors, 156 House members, 26 Senators, the head of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and other food security advocates will build support for RFS reform — or repeal.

The worst drought in 50 years has destroyed one-sixth of the U.S. corn crop. The USDA’s World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WSDE) report, released Friday, projects the smallest corn crop in six years and the lowest corn yields per acre since 1995.

As acreage, production, and yields declined, corn prices spiked. Last week, corn futures hit a record high of $8.29-3/4 per bushel.

If corn prices remain  high through 2013, livestock producers who use corn as a feedstock will incur billions of dollars in added costs. “These additional costs will either be passed on to consumers through increased food prices, or poultry farmers will be forced out of business,” warn the National Chicken Council and National Turkey Federation.

Even before the drought hit, corn prices were high. Prices increased from $2.00 a bushel in 2005/2006 to $6.00 a bushel in 2011/2012, notes FarmEcon LLC. A key inflationary factor is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), commonly known as the ethanol mandate. Since 2005, the RFS has required more and more billions of bushels to be used to fuel cars rather than feed livestock and people.

Suspension of the mandate would allow meat, poultry, and dairy producers to compete on a level playing field with ethanol producers for what remains of the drought-ravaged crop. That would reduce corn prices, benefiting livestock producers and consumers alike.

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has authority under the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) to waive the RFS blending targets, in whole or in part, if she determines that those requirements “would severely harm the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the United States.” The pressure on her to do so is mounting.

On July 30, a coalition of meat, dairy, and poultry producers petitioned Jackson to waive the 2012 and 2013 RFS blending requirements. From the petition:

As detailed below, the extraordinary and disastrous circumstances created for livestock and poultry producers by the ongoing drought in the heart of our grain growing regions requires that all relevant measures of relief be explored and taken where possible. One of these measures must be the amount of grain utilized for the production of renewable fuel. The ongoing drought is taking an enormous toll on the nation’s corn crop. As we detail below, the 15.2 billon gallon  renewable fuel standard (“RFS”) in 2012 coupled with the prospect of a 16.55 billion gallon standard in 2013 will require the renewable fuels industry to utilize a major portion of the drought-limited available corn supply. The drought-induced reductions in the corn supply means that the mandated utilization of corn for renewable fuels will so reduce the supply of corn and increase its price that livestock and poultry producers will be forced to reduce the size of their herds and flocks, causing some to go out of business and jobs to be lost. In addition to this direct harm, these herd and flock reductions will ripple through the meat, milk and poultry sectors, causing severe harm in the form of more job and economic losses. This drought-induced harm exists now, will continue to exist into the latter part of 2012 and 2013, and could continue to be felt in 2014 depending on the policy choices made now.

On August 1, bi-partisan groups of 156 House Members  and 26 Senators sent letters to Jackson asking her to “adjust” the RFS targets in light of the drought and rising corn prices. The House letter argues, in part:

As you are aware, U.S. corn prices have consistently risen, and the corn market has been increasingly volatile, since expansion of the RFS in 2007. This reflects the reality that approximately 40 percent of the corn crop now goes into ethanol production, a dramatic rise since the first ethanol mandates were put in place in 2005. Ethanol now consumes more corn than animal agriculture, a fact directly attributable to the federal mandate. While the government cannot control the weather, it fortunately has one tool still available that can directly impact corn demand. By adjusting the normally rigid Renewable Fuel Standard to align with current market conditions, the federal government can help avoid a dangerous economic situation because of the prolonged record high cost of corn.

 On August 9, Secretary General of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Jose Graziano da Silva called for an “immediate, temporary suspension” of the mandate  to help avert a repeat of the 2008 food crisis.

Also on August 9, the Govs. of Delaware (Jack Markell) and Maryland (Martin O’Malley), both Democrats, sent Jackson a letter in support of the industry coalition’s petition. From the Governors’ letter to Jackson:

In 2012, more than 40% of the U.S. annual corn supply was to be used to meet the RFS corn based ethanol requirements established annually by the EPA. If you were to exercise your statutory authority to waive the RFS standards for the next year, it would make more than 5 billion bushels of corn available to the marketplace for animal feed and foodstuffs, driving down costs and significantly lessening the financial impact to Delmarva’s [Delaware-Maryland-Virginia] poultry farms and consumers. While there may be some who question the true price impact of waiving the RFS standards for a limited period, those debates are quantitative, not qualitative, as it is not in dispute that a waiver would put downward pressure on corn pricing. Given the likely impacts to the poultry industry, not to mention the increased cost of food for consumers, of this dramatic increase in price due to the undersupply of corn, it is hard to imagine any scenario when exercising your authority would be more appropriate.

There is, alas, little chance Jackson will waive any part of the RFS. That would be asking an executive agency to put economic rationality ahead of political calculation in a presidential election year. President Obama today makes his fifth visit to Iowa this year. Iowa, with six electoral votes, is the heart of corn country. Supporting a waiver to lower corn prices would spoil the President’s photo ops.

Today’s Greenwire (subscription required) reports that the USDA has announced it will purchase up to $170 million worth of meat, poultry, and catfish to help producers who have been adversely affected by high corn prices. The fix on offer is not to scale back regulatory excess but to expand corporate welfare.  

Today, the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) published a study on the challenges facing the more than 120,000 U.S. convenience stores that sell motor fuel in a market increasingly shaped by the competing requirements of two federal programs: renewable fuel standard (RFS, a.k.a. the ethanol mandate) and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE).

I may have more to say about the study in a later post, but the skinny is that RFS and CAFE may whipsaw the retail fuel outlets upon which most of us depend to fill our tanks. CAFE will decrease the amount of fuel purchased and the frequency of consumer transactions at convenience stores, while the RFS will force convenience stores to make costly investments in storage tanks and blender pumps to sell increasing amounts and percentages of high-ethanol blends.

The excerpts below from NACS’s press release paint a disturbing picture on an industry caught in the regulatory cross hairs:

“RFS and CAFE policies cannot coexist without substantial changes in the retail and vehicle markets to accommodate significantly higher concentrations of renewable fuels, an unlikely scenario given that we may not even meet current requirements as they stand in 2012,” said John Eichberger, NACS vice president of government relations and the author of the new NACS whitepaper, The Future of Fuels: An Analysis of Future Energy Trends and Potential Retail Market Opportunities.

The Renewable Fuels Standard, revised by Congress as part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), requires that increasing amounts of qualified renewable fuels be integrated into the motor fuels supply, culminating at a minimum of 36 billion gallons in 2022. This mandate was expected to increase renewables to approximately 20% to 25% of the overall gasoline market in 2022, about double the rate of 10.4% last year.

Meanwhile, in 2011 the Obama administration proposed new CAFE standards, which are expected to be finalized this summer, that seek to increase the average fleet fuel efficiency to an equivalent of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. The cumulative effect of the two mandates is that renewable fuels will be required to represent a significantly greater share of the market than originally anticipated — perhaps as much as 40%, or four times higher than today.

“This level of renewable fuels penetration in the market will impose significant economic burdens on the retail fuels market and consumers,” said Eichberger. “To meet such a high renewable fuels concentration, it is likely that most retailers in the country will have to replace their underground storage tank systems and fuel dispensers. For the convenience industry alone, this will require a minimum infrastructure investment that will add nearly $22 billion to the cost of retailing fuels.” [And where will they get the scratch, I wonder, with CAFE depressing motor fuel demand and sales?]

Even after this enormous infrastructure investment, it still may be impossible to satisfy the RFS, considering that only one in six consumers will drive vehicles capable of running on the mandated fuels. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects only 16% of on-road vehicles in 2022 will be flexible fuel vehicles.

“Unless something dramatic happens, we will hit the ‘blend wall’ within the next two years and will not be able to meet RFS requirements. This will trigger massive fines throughout the petroleum distribution system that will increase the cost to sell motor fuels,” said Eichberger.

An industry expert explains the problem to me as follows:

It’s all about the drop in demand caused by increased fuel economy running up against inflexible volumetric mandates and an infrastructure that can’t meet those targets.

In a 140 billion gallon gasoline market, the ”blend wall” (how much ethanol may be blended annually into the nation’s motor fuel supply) is 14 billion gallons (full market penetration of E10 — motor fuel made with 10% ethanol).

If CAFE drops demand to 100 billion gallons, the blend wall drops to 10 billion gallons of ethanol. But the RFS requires the sale of 36 billion gallons by 2022. To sell 36 billion gallons of ethanol and meet and the proposed CAFE standards, E-10 must be replaced with E-40 nationwide. However, pumps and storage tanks at most convenience stores, most cars, and nearly all outboard motors, lawn mowers, and other small engines can’t handle E-40.

The goals of the two programs — cut fuel consumption, expand ethanol consumption — conflict with each other.

Folks, your government’s left hand does not seem to know what its other left hand is doing. Honk if you think central planners can’t plan!

Do biofuel mandates and subsidies inflate food prices? Do they increase world hunger ? There was a rip-roaring debate on the food security impacts of biofuel policies in 2007-2008, when sharp spikes in wheat, corn, and rice prices imperiled an estimated 100 million people in developing countries. Food price riots broke out in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen.

Experts attributed the rapid rise in food prices to several factors including high petroleum prices, drought in Australia, a weak U.S. dollar, commodity speculation, and rising demand for grain-fed meat by China’s rapidly expanding middle class. But some also laid part of the blame on biofuel policies, which artificially increase global demand for corn and soy while diverting those crops and farmland from food to fuel production. A July 2008 World Bank report argued that biofuel policies accounted for as much as two-thirds of the 2007-2008 price spike. A July 2010 World Bank report, on the other hand, concluded that rising petroleum prices were the dominant factor. “Biofuels played some role too, but much less than previously thought,” the report stated.

Where does the debate stand today? Recent reports by the National Research Council (NRC), the New England Complex Systems Institute (CSI), the UN Committee on World Food Security (CWFS), and Iowa State University (ISU) all acknowledge that biofuel policies put upward pressure on food and feed prices. The NRC and ISU studies argue that U.S. biofuel policies have only modest impacts on grain prices whereas the CSI and CWFS studies indicate that biofuel policies contributed significantly to the 2008 global food crisis and/or pose significant risks to global food security today.

Links to these reports and key excerpts follow.

National Research Council, Renewable Fuel Standard: Potential Economic and Environmental Effects of U.S. Biofuel Policy (2011):

Food-based biofuel is one of many factors that contributed to upward price pressure on agricultural commodities, food, and livestock feed since 2007; other factors affecting those prices included growing population overseas, crop failures in other countries, high oil prices, decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, and speculative activity in the marketplace.

To date, the agricultural commodities most affected by U.S. biofuels production are corn and soybean. The increased competition for these commodities created by an expanding biofuels market has contributed to upward pressure on their prices, but the increase has had a small effect on consumers’ food retail prices, except livestock products, because corn and soybean typically undergo some processing before reaching consumers’ food basket. The difference between the price of an unprocessed commodity and the retail price of processed food is typically large. The committee estimated that an increase of 20-40 percent in agricultural commodity prices would result in an increase in the retail price of most processed grocery food products (for example, breakfast cereal and bread) containing those commodities of only 1 to 2 percent.

New England Complex Systems Institute, Food Crises: A quantitative model of food prices including speculators and ethanol conversion (September 2011):

We further systematically consider other proposed factors affecting food prices. We provide quantitative evidence excluding all of them from playing a major role in recent price changes except corn to ethanol conversion. We show that, aside from the high price peaks, the underlying trends of increasing food prices match the increases in the rate of ethanol conversion.

Only a small fraction of the production of corn before 2000, corn ethanol consumed a remarkable 40% of US corn crops in 2011, promoted by US government subsidies based upon the objective of energy independence, and advocacy by industry groups. Corn serves a wide variety of purposes in the food supply system and therefore has impact across the food market. Corn prices also a ect the price of other crops due to substitutability at the consumer end and competition for land at the production end.

Regulation of markets and government subsidies to promote corn to ethanol conversion have distorted the existing economic allocation by diverting food to energy use. This raised equilibrium prices, increased energy supply by a small fraction (US corn ethanol accounted for less than 1% of US energy consumption in 2009 and reduced grain for food by a much larger one (US corn used for ethanol production is 4.3% of the total world grain production, even after allowing for the feed byproduct.

A parsimonious explanation that accounts for food price change dynamics over the past seven years can be based upon only two factors: speculation and corn to ethanol conversion. We can attribute the sharp peaks in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 to speculation, and the underlying upward trend to biofuels. The impact of changes in all other factors is small enough to be neglected in comparison to these effects.

UN Committee on World Food Security Security, A Report by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, Price volatility and food security (July 2011):

Biofuel support policies in the United States and the European Union have created a demand shock that is widely considered to be one of the major causes of the international food price rise of 2007/08.

By generating a new demand for food commodities that can outbid poor countries and food-insecure populations, industrial biofuels highlight the tension between a potentially unlimited demand (in this case for energy) and the constraints of a world with finite resources. Several proposals linked to changes in existing mandates could reduce the likelihood of biofuel production contributing to price spikes.

Given the major roles played by biofuels in diverting food to energy use, the CFS should demand of governments the abolition of targets on biofuels and the removal of subsidies and tariffs on biofuel production and processing.

Bruce A. Babcock, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, The Impact of U.S. Biofuel Policies on Agricultural Price Levels and Volatility (June 2011):

It is indisputable that biofuels contribute to higher agricultural commodity prices because the biofuel industry represents a large and growing share of demand for maize, vegetable oil and sugarcane. But biofuel production levels are not driven solely by government subsidies. Biofuels are the only large-scale substitute for liquid transportation fuels, so when crude oil prices rise, so too does the demand for biofuels. Furthermore, high agricultural commodity prices are not caused solely by expanded biofuel demand.

. . . a large expansion in US ethanol production would have occurred even if the subsidies and mandates had not been in place. The reason is that the return on investment in ethanol would have been so high that investors still would have brought their capital to the industry. As shown, the model indicates that in 2009, ethanol production would have been about 1.2 billion gallons lower without subsidies. The largest difference in production would have been in the 2008 marketing year when subsidies increased ethanol production by more than 2.3 billion gallons.

Market-based expansion of ethanol contributed about 50 percent to the difference in maize prices between 2004 and 2009. The direct conclusion of these results is that ethanol subsidies have had little impact on crop prices and that market-based expansion of ethanol had a large impact on maize prices, a modest impact on wheat prices and practically no impact on soybean and rice prices over this time period.

Overall, these results indicate that the effects of both ethanol subsidies and market-driven expansion of ethanol on US food prices have been small.

I may comment further on these reports in a future post. In the meantime, I will simply observe that if Babcock is correct, and U.S. biofuel policies have only a small influence on food prices because “a large expansion in US ethanol production would have occurred even if the subsidies and mandates had not been in place,” then U.S. taxpayers get little or no energy-security bang for billions of biofuel bucks.

As former OMB analyst Ken Glozer, author of Corn Ethanol: Who Pays, Who Benefits? explains in an op-ed based on his book:

The costs of ethanol policies are enormous, estimated at more than $500 billion to American consumers and taxpayers from 2008 to 2017. The taxpayer costs include subsidies to corn growers and for ethanol production.

The EIA forecast shows that current federal ethanol policy produces a minuscule additional amount of ethanol over what would be produced using a competitive market policy in the foreseeable future. In 2010, a mere 600 million gallons of additional ethanol were produced, roughly 5 percent of the 13 billion total gallons produced. In 2015, federal policies will increase production by just 1.4 billion gallons. The latter is less than 1 percent of U.S. gasoline consumption, and the cost per barrel of petroleum import reduction is an astounding $2,171.

From Glozer’s book: