The Competitive Enterprise Institute announced today that it is acting as co-counsel in a recently filed lawsuit in the state of New York against the state’s participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (a state cap and trade program). The lawsuit has been filed on behalf of small business owners in New York State who have faced increased electricity costs, and can be read here (.pdf). The American Spectator has a short write up here. The basis for the suit relies on the fact that elected officials in New York enrolled in the RGGI without approval by the state legislature. New York is the only state involved with RGGI who entered the initiative without approval from its legislature. As RGGI has forced electricity generators to purchase annual carbon allowances, it has raised the price of electricity for New York residents, effectively acting as a tax on electricity producers (those who produce more than 25 megawatts annually) in New York.

As far as its success or failure, the RGGI has faced many of the same problems similar programs have faced around the world. A very low allowance price for carbon will result in very little actual emissions reductions. Much of the ‘on paper’ emissions reductions will be made up by increased emissions in bordering states, as energy intensive industries relocate and electricity producers import energy from out of state. State legislators have raided the funds raised by RGGI and used them for unrelated purposes (the stated goals of RGGI are to use the funds to spur development in energy efficiency measures and increased production of non carbon emitting energy sources). In New York alone,$90 million of the ~$320 million raised by RGGI has been redirected towards budget shortfalls.

New Jersey recently signaled its intention to end its participation. Similar efforts are underway in New Hampshire (though they face a threatened veto by the Governor).

The American Northeast has attained metaphysical balance on energy rationing, thanks to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s (R)  announcement yesterday that he would withdraw the Garden State from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a multi-state cap-and-trade scheme. After New Jersey leaves, the remaining nine participants will be: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

Christie’s unexpected decision serves as the yin to New Hampshire’s yang. In late February, the New Hampshire House of Representatives  passed HB 519, legislation that would withdraw the Granite State from RGGI, by a 246 to 104 vote. At the time, it was widely thought that the Senate would quickly follow suit, as Republicans control the upper chamber. HB 519’s ultimate enactment appeared so certain, in fact, that Governor John Lynch (D) issued a pre-emptive veto. It should have been a futile gesture, because Republicans hold a veto-proof majority in both chambers of the legislature. Then the environmentalist lobby mobilized and frightened many members of the Senate. The bill was delayed. And in early May, the full Senate, where Republicans enjoy a 2 to 1 majority, voted to remain in the the regional energy rationing scheme. New Hampshire Republicans had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

Gov. Christie has had a somewhat tortuous history with RGGI. During the press conference yesterday, he went to great lengths to state his belief that mankind is causing dangerous global warming, which is unfortunate. He justified his decision to withdraw from RGGI based on the fact that the regional cap-and-trade scheme was an energy tax that had no impact on the global climate, which is true.

Only a year ago, however, he was a climate skeptic. Back then, he expressed reservations about RGGI, but he nonetheless stayed in the program. The most likely reason that he waited so long to withdraw was because the cap-and-trade revenues were too good to pass up. Under state law (the 2008 Global Warming Solutions Fund Act), he was supposed to spend RGGI revenues, which are generated from quarterly sales of energy rationing coupons, on green energy. But Gov. Christie redirected those funds to deficit reduction.

Environmentalists have promised to litigate, but that looks like a dead end. From what I understand, the authorizing legislation explicitly gives the Governor the authority to join and withdraw from the regional pact. Unless the New Jersey Legislature enacts legislation to keep the state in RGGI, the greens’ hands are tied. Or so it appears to me, a non-lawyer.

Lastly, I’ll note that overall, Gov. Christie’s ideas on energy are awful, as is suggested by the title of yesterday’s address, “New Jersey’s Future Is Green.” The Governor is committed to wasting taxpayer money on expensive, unreliable green energy, and he also announced a moratorium on coal power. Read all about his crummy energy policies here.

Has the EU met its emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol? Not if emissions associated with goods Europe imports from Asia are taken into account. So finds a study published this week in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS).

The study, Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008, calculates the net increase in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions resulting from developed countries’ imports of goods produced in developing countries. The study provides additional evidence of Kyoto’s futility, although the authors, a team of Norwegian, German, and U.S. researchers, don’t draw this conclusion and would likely deny it.

Some key findings:

• Global CO2 from the production of traded goods increased from 4.3 gigatons (Gt) in 1990 (20% of global emissions) to 7.8 Gt in 2008 (26%).
• Emissions from production of exports increased 4.3% annually, faster than the growth in global population (1.4% per year), CO2 emissions (2.0% per year), and GDP (3.6% per year), although not as fast as the dollar value of international trade (12% per year).
• Global emissions increased 39% from 1990 to 2008. At the regional level, emissions from developed countries (classified as “Annex B” countries in the Kyoto Protocol, with quantified emission limitations) largely stabilized, but emissions from developing countries (non-Annex B) doubled.
• However, territorial emission inventories don’t take into account “consumption-based emissions” — CO2 emitted in developing countries to produce goods consumed in developed countries.
• The “net emission transfers” via international trade from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO2 in 2008 — 17% per year average growth. 
• Developed countries ”imported” more emissions than they reduced domestically via efforts to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.
  • “For comparison, if the average emission reduction target for Annex B countries in the Kyoto Protocol (~5% reduction of 1990 emissions) is applied to CO2 emissions only, representing ~0.7 Gt CO2 per year, then the net emission transfers from non-Annex B to Annex B countries is 18% higher on average (1990-2008) and 130% higher in 2008.”
  • “Because estimated Annex B emission reductions from 1990 to 2008 are only ~ 2%, representing only 0.3 Gt CO2, the net emission transfers from the group of non-Annex B countries is 520% higher in 2008.”
  • “Collectively, the net CO2 emissions reduction of ~2% (0.3 Gt CO2) in Annex B countries from 1990 to 2008 is much smaller than the additional net emission transfer of 1.2 Gt CO2 from non-Annex B countries . . .”
• China’s emissions accounted for 55% of the growth in global CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2008. Chinese exports accounted for 18% of the growth in global emissions and for 47% of the growth in Annex B consumption-based emissions.
• Curiously, “International trade in non-energy-intensive manufactured products dominates the net emission transfers (accounting for 41% of the growth), despite the policy focus on energy-intensive manufacturing.”

In the discussion section of their paper, the authors observe that the increase in consumption-based emissions “may benefit economic growth in developing countries, but the increased emissions could also make future mitigation more costly in developing countries.” Right, but that has two obvious implications the authors do not mention: (1) Developing countries are unlikely to accept mandatory emission limits in the foreseeable future; and (2) Kyoto-like controls on developing country emissions could be harshly disruptive to global trade and investment.

The authors argue that the rapid growth in “imported” emissions is not a case of “carbon leakage” — the flight of capital, jobs, and emissions from countries with CO2 controls to countries lacking such controls. They find, for example, that “both the United States and European Union have had a large increase in net emission transfers, but only the European Union has a broad-based climate policy.”  

Undoubtedly multiple factors contribute to the rapid growth of China’s export sector. However, one factor boosting investment in China is low energy cost. A closely related factor is the regulatory certainty that Beijing will not slap a price on carbon in the policy-relevant future or erect political roadblocks to the development of energy resources and infrastructure. How very different is the political climate in the USA! 

America may not have a “broad-based climate policy,” but we have an EPA bent on ‘legislating‘ climate policy via the Clean Air Act, an EPA implementing a panoply of non-climate regulations with the same (or even greater) potential to suppress electric generation from coal, regional greenhouse gas policies, state-level renewable energy mandates, an environmental movement hostile to fossil fuels and natural resource development, politicians in Congress and the White House imbued with the same mentality, and countless NIMBY activists determined to block construction of all energy-related infrastructure.

The researchers, methinks, take too narrow a view of the policy-related risks that can cause or contribute to carbon leakage.