Kyoto Negotiations

Backdoor Implementation

Some Senators fear that Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat misled them when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “We have no intention, through the backdoor or anything else, without Senate confirmation, of trying to impose or take any steps to impose what would be binding restrictions on our companies, on our industry, on our business, or on our agriculture, or on our commerce, or on our country until and unless the Senate of the United States says so.”

The key verb in Eizenstats statement, however, is “binding.” The administration, The Weekly Standard (March 16, 1998) points out, will “threaten, cajole, plead with, urge, and cheerlead the states into abiding by Kyoto. And they will do it through the front doors, back doors, side doors, and trap doors, whether the Senate approves or not. Theyll just never do anything binding.”

Indeed, a confidential Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) document suggests that the Clinton Administration may be trying to implement the treaty without Senate ratification. The document argues that the EPA has the necessary authority under the existing Clean Air Act to restrict carbon dioxide emissions without Congressional approval. The document states that power plant “emissions must be reduced in order to fulfill the administrations commitment to clean air and to meet our greenhouse gas emissions budget under the Kyoto Protocol.” The EPA, however, would prefer to get clearer regulatory authority from Congress.

The document also reveals that the EPA wishes to implement a comprehensive regulatory scheme, which would include emission trading, in conjunction with electricity deregulation. But concedes, “these current authorities do not easily lend themselves to establishing market-based cap-and-trade programs.”

Moreover, in testimony before the House VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Committee, Carol Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, told committee members that “This budget reflects the Presidents determination that through the Research Fund for America the U.S. will lead the world in meeting the challenge of global warming by reducing greenhouse gases and doing so in a way that grows the economy.

The Climate Change Technology Initiative, a multi-Agency initiative including EPA, DOE, and HUD will enable us to meet that challenge. EPAs share . . . at $205 million, will help America meet its global new [sic] responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through market forces, new technology, and energy efficiency. EPA will work with industry to find sensible, cost-effective ways to meet the global warming challenge, all the while continuing on a path of economic growth.”

Seeking clarification on the Administrations position, Senators Trent Lott (R-MS), Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) sent a letter to President Clinton on March 3 asking him to personally assure them that there are no plans to implement the treaty without Senate ratification. Rep. David McIntosh (R-IN) announced plans to monitor any such “implementation without raticification” in his House Subcommittee.”

The Greens Success at Kyoto

In a December 11, 1997 memo, Tom Wathen, Executive Vice President of the National Environmental Trust (NET), brags about their successes at the United Nations climate change conference in Kyoto, Japan. NET, formerly known has the Environmental Information Center, works to disseminate information to activists and the media on environmental issues to advance specific campaigns.

Wathen says that the campaigns “success did not come about from just two days or even two weeks of negotiations. The developments that ultimately made success at Kyoto possible were brought about as a result of two years of work by NETs campaign.” Over that two years NET “educated hundreds of reporters on the science and policy of climate change so that industry did not have a free hand in framing the debate.”

The result of this extended campaign, according to Wathen, is that “In a change from just six months ago, most media stories no longer presented global warming as just a theory over which reasonable scientists could differ. Most stories described predictions of global warming as the position of the overwhelming number of mainstream scientists.”

Other successes claimed by NET was assuring that “credible” scientists like Ben Santer and Ross Gelbspan [sic] were able to respond to “industry misinformation.” They also claimed credit for drawing attention to the “industry misinformation campaign by succeeding in getting CNN to suspend temporarily inaccurate industry advertising on the subject.” NET also takes credit for placing op-eds by Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, former UK environment minister John Gummer, and Michael Grubb of Londons Royal Institute of International Affairs,” among others.

Enrons spokesperson Carol Hensley confirmed NETs involvement in drafting Lays op-ed and said it was placed through Knight-Ridder and appeared in a number of newspapers, according to the Science & Environmental Policy Project (The Week That Was, January 19-25, 1998, www.sepp.org).

The memo stresses the importance of effective visuals. Wathen writes, “the principle problem with television coverage of climate change issues is that there are limited visuals to work with. Reporters can only run the stock footage of hurricanes and drought-parched fields so many times. So NET developed a series of computer animations showing progressive inundation of 15 U.S. cities as the climate warms. The animations spurred dozens of stories and ran on ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN, and we fed them to local stations by satellite.”

Goodbye Emission Trading?

The Clinton Administration has made a lot out of its ability to negotiate a protocol that includes emission trading because they claim trading will significantly reduce compliance costs. Not so fast. The latest word from Raul Estrada-Oyuela, the head of the United Nations commission that negotiated the pact, is that emission trading may be phased out after eight years.

Emission trading, according to Estrada, may discourage developing countries from participating in the Kyoto Protocol. Developing countries worry that emission trading would allow developed countries to pollute. “We want to make sure were not creating a new crop for nations to sell,” Estrada said (Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1998).

While visiting the U.S. Estrada also discussed other issues related to global warming negotiations. As to the likelihood of developing country participation he does not see binding limits being imposed on developing nations in Buenos Aires. A framework for voluntary controls on developing country emissions is the most “optimistic” scenario. China, of course, has remained adamantly opposed to emission controls, voluntary or otherwise.

The private sector, said Estrada, is critical in achieving emissions reductions in the developing countries. He believes that the billions of dollars of foreign direct investment should be channeled into efficient technology through policy changes in both developed and developing countries.

The Kyoto Protocols enforcement mechanism will consist of progress reports produced by the participating country. Review teams will examine the reports and pass them along to the conference of parties, Estrada explained. This type of enforcement mechanism has worked well under the Montreal Protocol, according to Estrada. “Commitments either are fulfilled or non-compliance will be exposed,” Estrada said. Countries will not want to be exposed as not complying with international agreements.

Finally, Estrada estimated that it will be at least three years before the United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol (BNA Daily Environment Report, March 17, 1998).

The Administrations Negotiating Strategy

On March 4, 1998, Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat reassured the House Commerce Subcommittee that the U.S. was committed to getting “meaningful” developing country participation. Under questioning, however, Eizenstat admitted that the Clinton Administration will sign the Kyoto Protocol as it now stands even if developing countries do not agree to participate. When asked whether this takes away the U.S.s leverage to get developing country participation, Eizenstat replied that it will give negotiators greater leverage because it will show that the U.S. is serious about stopping global warming.

Kyoto Protocol Can be Fixed

Robert Stavins, professor of public policy and Chair of the Environment and Natural Resources Program at Harvards Kennedy School of Government, said at a briefing for Capitol Hill staff members that the Kyoto Protocol is flawed, but can become a good foundation for future greenhouse policies if it is fixed.

To fix the protocol it will be necessary, says Stavins, to include at least four developing countries: China, Brazil, India, and South Korea. Stavins argued that limiting the protocol to developed countries will cause energy intensive industries to relocate to developing countries, driving up future emission control costs for these countries.

Another remedy for the protocol is clearly defined and workable rules for an international emission trading system. Such a system, argues Stavins, will drastically cut abatement costs for the industrialized countries. He claims that the U.S. could cut its compliance costs by as much as 90 percent with the right system.

Stavins also recommends that rather than distribute emissions allowances free of charge to U.S. firms, the U.S. government should auction the allowances, using the proceeds to lower federal taxes on labor and investment (BNA Daily Environment Report, February 27, 1998).

Kyoto is Doomed to Fail

In an article in Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998), Richard N. Cooper of Harvard University argues that the Kyoto Protocol as it now stands is “bound to fail.” The Kyoto framework is a set of agreed-upon national objectives that allows each country to comply in its own way. This will be achieved through trading emission rights.

The problem, as Cooper sees it, is that it will be impossible to arrive at an agreed upon distribution of emission rights between rich and poor countries, precluding developing country participation which will be needed to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions.

There are three reasons, says Cooper, why collective action on climate change will be difficult. First, “Effective restraint must . . . involve all actual and prospective major emitters of greenhouse gases.” Second, “the rewards from restraints on greenhouse gases will come in the politically distant future, while the costs will be incurred in the political present.” Third, reducing greenhouse gas emissions “will involve changes in behavior by hundreds of millions if not billions of people, not merely the fiat of 180 or so governments.”

Other problems, of course, involve the high costs of compliance. If a family of four in the U.S. wishes to sustain its current level of emissions it could be required to pay $2,200, says Cooper. U.S. transfers to the rest of the world could be as high as $130 billion a year.

What then does Cooper recommend? “[M]ost of the reduction in the rich countries must come at or near the points of final demand, where the number of consumers is greatest,” says Cooper. “The reductions must be achieved by some combination of taxation, exhortation, publicity, and environmental education.”

Since it is necessary for governments to change the behavior of its citizens it may be far easier for the parties of the Framework Convention on Climate Change to agree to a common use of emission reduction instruments rather than to a national allocation of emission rights. The instrument that Cooper favors is a carbon emission tax.

Monitoring such a tax could fall under the authority of the International Monetary Fund, since all “important” countries, with the exception of Cuba and North Korea, “hold annual consultations with the IMF on their macroeconomic policies, including the overall level and composition of their tax revenues.”

The IMF would report to a monitoring agent of the treaty and these reports “could be supplemented by international inspection of major taxpayers such as electric utilities, and the tax agencies of participating countries.

Finally, Cooper points out that carbon taxes would yield $750 billion worldwide, some of which should go to the United Nations to pay for refugee programs, peacekeeping and other UN programs.

The Center for Security Policy has done extensive research on the issue of global warming and national defense.

You may choose to browse or search their site, or read the following article which directly discusses the Kyoto Treaty and National Defense.

Senator Inhofe Opposes Clintons Greenhouse Budget

U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) has made it clear he will oppose the Clinton Administrations $6.3 billion tax and subsidy proposal designed “to try to mold the behavior of U.S. businesses to conform with the global warming ideology.”

“The Presidents decision to sidestep the treaty ratification process and start unilaterally implementing the Global Warming agreement is wrong,” Inhofe said. “There should be no action taken by the Administration on this issue before the Senate deals directly with the treaty and its surrounding issues.”

Though President Clinton says that manmade global warming has arrived, Inhofe says that in Senate committee hearings “we determined just the opposite.”

“There are huge ambiguities and uncertainties,” according to Inhofe, “about what is happening in global climate change and what can and should be done. Once again, the President is not telling the whole truth about what the science is and what it means.”

Eizenstat Testifies Before Congress

Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, chief negotiator of the Kyoto Protocol, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 12 that the Clinton Administration has “no intention, through the back door or anything else, without Senate confirmation, of trying to impose or take any steps to impose what would be binding restrictions on our companies, on our industry, on our business, on our agriculture, on our commerce, on our country, until and unless the Senate of the United States says so.”

When asked by Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Ne) what new laws and regulations will be required to bring the U.S. into compliance, however, Eizenstat said that with the exception of legislation needed to establish a domestic emission trading system, no new laws would be required. “I think it can all be done within existing authorities,” Eizenstat said.

Hagel also asked Eizenstat whether the U.S. military had received a “blanket-exemption” from emission reduction targets. After trying to dodge the question, Eizenstat finally answered: “. . . we took care of those concerns the military has, and that includes those actions we unilaterally initiate that have a multilateral component, as almost everything does.”

Apparently all military actions that do not have a multilateral component (read: UN approval) will be subject to the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol, then, will further subject the U.S. military to the whims of the United Nations.

The hearings were also supposed to include Janet Yellen, Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, to provide the Senate with an economic impact statement which they have promised since last summer. But Eizenstat said that the economic report of the president has delayed the economic analysis of the Kyoto Protocol. Eizenstat assured the committee that the report would show “that the costs to the economy are reasonable” and that “delaying action will only increase the costs.”

“I find it astounding,” said Hagel, “that our negotiators in Kyoto were basing their decisions on what obligations to commit the Unites States to but are unwilling to share those numbers with the U.S. Senate.”

Scientists Throw Cold Water on Kyoto Agreement

Although the Clinton Administration argues that the Kyoto Protocol is a major environmental achievement, many scientists are less optimistic. The agreement is a political victory for those who wish to centrally plan the worlds energy consumption. It will not, however, do much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

According to Jerry Mahlman, director of the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton University, “The best Kyoto can do is to produce a small decrease in the rate of increase.” Even so the Protocol still requires the U.S. to reduce emissions by about 40 percent by the year 2012.

Bert Bolin, outgoing Chairman of the IPCC, said, “If no further steps are taken during the next 10 years, CO2 will increase in the atmosphere during the first decade of the next century essentially as it has done during the past few decades.”

Most supporters of the treaty admit that it is only a first step. “[Y]ou have to walk before you can run,” said John Holdren a Harvard University professor of environmental policy. “If you want the energy system to look different in the next century you have to start now” (The Washington Post, February 13, 1998).

Unresolved Issues

An article in Resources (Winter 1998), a publication of Resources for the Future, discusses the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol.

Several things, according to the authors, are needed to close the “significant gaps” which remain in the treaty. First, clearly defined rules and institutions are needed to govern both international emission trading and joint implementation. Second, clear criteria for judging compliance must be established. Third, developing countries must agree to limit their emissions at some specific date. Fourth, specific short-term goals should be set for developed countries to make long-term reductions easier.

The authors argue “that the proposed target and timetable will impose significant costs on the United State and the global economy, even after accounting for new technology stimulated by domestic policies.”

Greenhouse Pork on Wheels

The U.S. government will contribute $20 million towards a $40 million collaberative effort with industry “to produce by 2004 buses, delivery trucks, trolleys, municipal fleets and other medium-sized vehicles that use half as much fuel and emit 30 percent less exhaust than todays vehicles.”

The administration has requested $10 million for the Department of Energy and $10 million for the Department of Transportation. Seven regional research groups will contribute the remaining $20 million. Companies involved in the regional research groups include Southern California Edison Co., FMC Corp., Intel Corp., Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. and AlliedSignal Inc. Regional transit authorities, environmental groups such as the National Resources Defense Council, and state agencies are also involved (Automotive News, February 9, 1998.

You Think One Kyoto is Bad? Try Thirty

Jorge Sarmiento of Princeton University told Science (December 19, 1997) after the completion of the Kyoto accord that “It is a laudable and reasonable first step, but much deeper emissions cuts will be needed in the not too distant future if we are going to meaningfully reduce the rate of warming.” Indeed, as the treaty now stands increases in developing country emissions will swamp emission reductions by the industrialized countries.

According to Thomas Wigley, a climate researcher at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in order to stabilize emissions (a major objective of the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change) the developing countries would have to freeze emissions at current levels while the industrial countries would have to cut emissions in half. This, according to Jerry Mahlman, director of the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton “might take another 30 Kyotos over the next century.”

But, says Sarmiento, “you have to start somewhere, and the protocol at least provides a framework for revisiting the issue as our understanding improves.”

Treaty May Be Moot

The European Union’s Environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard, told the European Parliament that the Kyoto treaty may not come into force because of opposition from the United States Senate.

The treaty requires ratification by 55 participants to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change which corresponds to 50 percent of carbon emissions in developed countries. Since the U.S. accounts for 35 percent of the total and Russia accounts for 15 percent, at least one of them would have to ratify the treaty for it to take effect.

Bjerregaard said that “To facilitate U.S. ratification, it is crucial that the [European Union] moves ahead as quickly as possible to maintain the highest possible political pressure” (BNA Daily Environment Report, December 22, 1997).

The Washington Post Comes Clean

Commenting on the climate change agreement penned in Kyoto, the Washington Post (December 12, 1997) warns that the U.S. could see significant cost increases. The Clinton administration is counting on “modest tools, including fuel-efficient technology, such as hybrid gas and electric cars, and business incentives, such as tax breaks, to do the job [of cutting greenhouse gases].” But, argues the Post, significant cuts in emissions “may require a wide array of tools designed to reduce emissions caused by houses, factories, cars and consumption.”

Robert Stavins, an economist of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, claims that the “lowest-cost method” of reducing carbon emissions would be a carbon tax. “It would probably take a tax of $150 per ton of carbon content on fossil fuels,” Stavins said. “That would mean an increase in coal prices of about 350 percent, and about 100 percent on petroleum and natural gas.” For consumers this translates into an average increase in gasoline and residential electricity prices of about 40 percent nationwide, or 3 percent of GDP. “That’s approximately the cost of complying with all other environmental regulations combined,” says Stavins.

This contrasts significantly from statements by President Clinton who said, “I see already the papers are full of people saying, ‘The sky is falling, the sky is falling, it’s a terrible thing.'” The treaty skeptics are not to be believed, according to the President, since the economy remains healthy despite past environmental initiatives. This statement, however, hides the fact that the economy, though growing at a normal rate, is on a lower trajectory than it otherwise would be. Environmental regulations probably do not affect long-term growth rates but they do irrevocably affect long-term wealth. The massive increase in environmental compliance costs that will result from the climate change agreement will have immediate affects on GDP growth and a permanent loss of wealth.

Big Business Looks Out for Themselves

In November, five leaders of major U.S. companies met, at the behest of Fortune magazine (December 8, 1997) to discuss the “corporate, national, and international implications of global warming.” The result was somewhat discouraging. Typical of many corporate CEOs, they were not averse to regulation as long as it doesn’t hurt them relative to others. This attitude was expressed by Paul O’Neill of Alcoa: “The cost implications for Alcoa are enormous. But there’s comfort in the fact that we’re not greatly different from the others in the industry. To maintain a good position in the world, we need to stay ahead of the competition, which I am sure we can do. We’ll be all right.”

Michael Bonsignore who runs Honeywell called for a compromise at least to establish objectives, “including a mechanism to transfer technology from the developed world to the developing world.” Of course, taxpayers would pay for the transfers and Honeywell would reap all the benefits of corporate welfare.

Though the discussion as a whole was disappointing there were a couple of encouraging remarks. Alex Trotman, CEO of Ford Motor, seems to understand the reality of the situation. “One of the things we fear most is that we would have to address stringent targets with today’s technology. We’re a long-lead-time, capital-intensive industry. If we were to change over a number of engine lines, for example, [it would cost] billions of dollars using today’s technology. By the time we’re just about to start making those engines, we will have discovered, I guarantee you, some major leap that we will have negated by investing early.”

Bill Ruckelshaus, former head of the Environmental Protection Agency under Nixon and Reagan, and current chairman of Browning-Ferris Industries said, “What I think the Vice President really needs to do . . . is don’t take science at face value, as though there is no debate. A scientist often will make political pronouncements in the name of science, when what he’s really talking about are policy choices that a cabdriver has the credentials to make as much as him.”

New Carbon Emission Forecast

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) has revised its projections for United States carbon emissions, making it more difficult to reduce emissions than previously thought. Faster economic growth and lower energy prices have prompted the EIA to raise its projections by 5 percent, claiming that carbon emissions in the U.S. will increase by 34 percent by the year 2010 and by 45 percent by the year 2020 (Nature, November 20, 1997).

The Kyoto agreement to cut emission by 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 will require the U.S. to cut emission by more than 40 percent below the levels that would have been otherwise achieved.

What Have We Done?

In November the Clinton Administration announced its negotiating position for the upcoming Kyoto conference. It proposed stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels and meaningful participation by developing countries. Negotiators went to Kyoto assuring the American people that if they did not get what it wanted the U.S. delegation would walk away from the treaty. But upon the arrival of Vice President Al Gore, the U.S. promptly conceded its position.

Industrialized nations have agreed to a global warming protocol covering six “greenhouse gases” — carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The U.S. target is 7 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, forcing U.S. emissions more than 40 percent below what they otherwise are projected to be in 2010. Japan’s target was set at 6 percent, and the European Union’s was set at 8 percent while Australia will be allowed to increase emissions by 8 percent above 1990 levels. The treaty does not commit any developing nations to emissions reductions.

There are several disturbing aspects of the treaty. First, the treaty amendment process violates U.S. sovereignty. Articles 19 and 20 of the Protocol states that future climate treaty commitments, approved by three-fourths of the parties, shall “enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after . . . [being accepted] by at least three fourths of the Parties to the Protocol.” The failure to clarify that acceptance means the satisfaction of the constitutional requirements of that state would seem to bypass US Senate ratification requirements for treaty obligations. The text also stipulates that “No reservations may be made to this Protocol” [Art. 25], further isolating the climate treaty from democratic procedures.

Second, the treaty does not comply with Byrd-Hagel resolution. The draconian reduction targets agreed to will harm the American economy, and Third World participation is only garnered through the voluntary “Clean Development Mechanism,” whereby financial aid and technology are transferred to developing countries – who will not be held to any energy restriction timetables or goals.

Finally, the treaty threatens world economic growth. Article 2 of the draft Protocol requires nations to promote sustainable development through:

  • “protection and enhancement of [carbon] sinks” [Art. 2.1.a.ii] This provision along with Art. 3.4 on “land-use change” provides for the expansion of land-use controls and forestry restrictions;
  • A “sustainable forms of agriculture” [Art. 2.1.a.iii], implying greater restrictions on farming practices;
  • “Progressive reduction and phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions” [Art 2.1.a.v].

Under this provision, nations would have to raise taxes on currently untaxed activities as well as raise tariff barriers against certain imports. International trade flows are threatened by protectionism disguised as climate change prevention. Economists have no means of making the vague “market imperfection” concept precise – as worded, this is an open-ended invitation for mischief.

Nations are obligated to pursue regulation of aviation and marine bunker fuels through international agencies [Art 2.2], suggesting further restraints on international trade, transportation and tourism.

President Clinton has said he will not submit the treaty for ratification to the Senate until key developing countries, such as China and India have agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions, which probably won’t happen until 1999, according to the Washington Post (December 12, 1997).

Congressional Reactions

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Tenn) assailed the president for withholding the treaty from ratification “for cynical political reasons.” Lott said, “The president directed his negotiators to sign this treaty. The president should have the strength of his convictions to submit this treaty as soon as possible for the scrutiny of the United States Senate.” Sen. John H. Chafee (R-Rhode Island) said the “possibilities for Senate approval of a treaty appear slim at the moment” (Washington Post, December 12, 1997).

Others have been less charitable. Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska) said that agreement “is fundamentally flawed and dead on arrival.” (Washington Times, December 12, 1997). House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) called the agreement “an outrage” and accused the administration of surrendering to pressure in Kyoto. “Early reports indicate that on 10 critical issues such as cuts in emissions, future developing country commitments and new U.S. commitments, we sacrificed the future well-being of the country based on environmental correctness and inconclusive science,” said Gingrich. Senator James M. Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) called the agreement “a political, economic and national security fiasco” (New York Times, December 12, 1997).

Please note these articles were written and posted during the Kyoto global warming conference in 1997. Therefore some of the information may be dated.

Read the Final Kyoto Agreement — You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this document

Update – Dec. 10 — US Negotiators Sell Out Position to Reach a Tentative Agreement

Update – Dec. 9 — Anticipation Builds for Kyoto Finale

Update – Dec. 8 — Gore Says US Will Compromise Position

Update – Dec. 5 — Third World Fumes

Update – Dec. 4 — Who is Speaking for the US?

Update – Dec. 3 — 500 Physicians, Scientists Oppose Climate Treaty

Update – Dec. 2 — US Changes Stance as Gore Plans to Attend Conference

Update – Dec. 1 — Climate Conference Opens

Update – Nov. 20 — Media contacts available for comments on Kyoto

Industrialized nations have tentatively agreed to a global warming protocol covering six “greenhouse gases” — carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. The US target would be 7 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, forcing US emissions more than 30 percent below what they otherwise are projected to be in 2010. Japans target was set at 6 percent, and the European Unions was said to be 8 percent.

UN officials promised the final text of a Kyoto Protocol by late evening on December 10, but few expect this deadline to be met after experiencing many false alarms. The final details are still in doubt as of this writing, with developing nations still uneasy over key provisions affecting their interests.

The Clinton-Gore Administration is heading for a dramatic showdown with the US Senate. The energy use curbs needed to comply with the cliamte treaty are far deeper than expected, though emissions trading and carbon “sink” concepts are included to disguise the pain.

Already, available details about the Kyoto Protocol have angered key US Senators. “The position of the United States continues to drift farther and farther from the US Senate baseline of S. Res. 98, the Byrd-Hagel resolution,” said Sen. Chuck Hagel, “…its obvious that [to the Vice President] flexibility is defined as make a deal at any cost.”

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott also lashed out at the Administration. In a letter to Sen. Hagel, leader of the Senates observer group in Kyoto, Sen. Lott expressed “amazement” at the Administrations blatant disregard of the Byrd-Hagel resolution. “Recent developments in Kyoto have only added to the bleak prospects for Senate ratification” states the letter.

The Majority Leader emphasized five criteria the Kyoto Protocol must adhere to: no erosion of American sovereignty, no hidden taxes, no loss of American jobs, no disadvantage to American business, and no special advantages to the Third World. “The treaty under discussion appears to fail on all five counts,” he observed.

Opposition to the climate treaty is not limited to Republicans. Sen. Hagel reports that a distressed Sen. Robert Byrd, West Virginia Democrat, asked him to deliver a strongly-worded message to State Department lead negotiator Stu Eisenstat. One of Sen. Byrds chief worries is that the Administration will try to withhold the Kyoto Protocol from Senate ratification until a much later date. Lacking the votes now, the climate treaty could remain in limbo for several years. But this tactic would antagonize key Senators who President Clinton must work with on other matters.

Latest Protocol Draft Riddled with Flaws

Today CEI released “A Brief Contrarian Critique and Analysis of the Draft Kyoto Protocol.” Based on the latest draft available, dated December 9, we identified several objections to fine print in the treaty language, summarized below. These considerations will no doubt factor into the global warming debate in Washington.

1. Unacceptable Energy Taxes on the US

The Clinton-Gore Administration’s climate treaty proposal for a “trading umbrella” (US, Japan, Russia, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) represents a global energy tax levied on the American people via their fuel and electricity bills.

In the draft Protocol, the “Clean Development Mechanism” and its associated “user fees” [Art. 14.8] are still another form of global energy taxes. This provision constitutes a major step toward granting the UN its long sought independent taxation authority, allowing an international bureaucracy to impose levies on US companies and consumers.

2. Does Not Comply with Byrd-Hagel Resolution

Draconian energy use reduction targets are on the table, measures that will harm the American economy and export US jobs. The Clinton-Gore trading umbrella scheme would force American industry to fund its competitors in Russia and the former Soviet republics.

Third World participation is only garnered through the voluntary “Clean Developent Mechanism,” whereby financial aid and technology are transferred to developing countries — who will not be held to the same energy restriction timetables as the US.

3. Treaty Amendment Process Violates US Sovereignty

Articles 22 and 23 of the draft Protocol states that future climate treaty commitments, approved by three-fourths of the parties, shall be “adopted only with the written consent of the Party concerned.” The failure to clarify that the “Party concerned” is the nation state and that consent means the satisfaction of the constitutional requirements of that state would seem to bypass US Senate ratification requirements for treaty obligations.

The draft text stipulates that “No reservations may be made to this Protocol,” [Art. 27] further isolating the climate treaty from democratic procedures.

4. Threatens World Economic Growth

Article 2 of the draft Protocol requires nations to promote sustainable development through:

  • protection and enhancement of [carbon] sinks [Art. 2.1.a..i] This provision along with Art. 3.5 on land-use change provides for the expansion of land-use controls and forestry restrictions. 
  • sustainable forms of agriculture [Art. 2.1.a..iii] Implied here is the restriction of fertilizers, pesticides, and biotechnology, with negative consequences for the worlds ability to produce food. 
  • reduction and phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions [Art 2.1.a.v] Under this provision, nations would have to raise taxes on currently untaxed activities as well as raise tariff barriers against certain imports. International trade flows are threatened by protectionism disguised as climate change prevention. Economists have no means of making the vague market imperfection concept precise as worded, this is an open-ended invitation for mischief. 
  • Nations are obligated to pursue regulation of aviation and marine bunker fuels through international agencies [Art 2.2], suggesting further restraints on international trade, transportation and tourism.

KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Click here for the full document (PDF).