A little known document sheds new light on the now 17-year-long controversy over EPA’s Clean Air Act authority with respect to greenhouse gases. The document is a letter of January 26, 1990 from EPA Administrator William Reilly to U.S. Senators. Reilly sets forth the Bush I administration’s reasons for removing greenhouse gas (GHG) regulatory provisions from S. 1630, the Senate version of the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990. Judging by the fact that the Senate later agreed to drop those provisions from the 1990 CAA as enacted, Reilly’s letter would appear to be a key piece of evidence for assessing legislative intent.
Would consideration of the document have altered the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)? We will never know. What’s hard to fathom is why no party to the case cited the letter. Maybe it was already lost in the mists of time.
Reilly apprises Senators that the Bush I administration “strongly opposes” S. 1630’s “requirement for reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from auto tailpipes” — the same basic policy petitioners in Massachusetts would later sue EPA to adopt. Noting that the S. 1630 CO2 emission standards translate into motor vehicle mileage standards, Reilly highlights three reasons for striking the provision, two of which are germane to issues debated in Massachusetts:
First, it is premature to mandate specific controls to address global warming. International studies are underway. International negotiations on a framework convention on global climate change are scheduled for this year and should be completed prior to unilateral U.S. action.
Second, fuel-economy requirements raise important non-environmental questions that need to be carefully considered, such as feasibility, cost and competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry with foreign manufacturers.
In addition, Reilly contends, the CO2 standards and provisions to regulate ozone-depleting substances based on global warming potential do not “appear to be a particularly effective approach to such a geographically vast problem.”
In Massachusetts, States and environmental groups challenged Bush II EPA’s rejection of a petition to establish motor vehicle emission standards for CO2 and other GHGs. EPA air chief Jeff Holmstead based the agency’s decision on both statutory and policy grounds (68 FR 52922-52933). The Court dismissed the latter arguments as “policy concerns,” “policy judgments,” and “reasoning divorced from the statutory text.” However, some of Holmstead’s policy reasons for not regulating GHGs under the CAA reprise Reilly’s reasons for keeping GHG regulatory provisions out of the CAA. Specifically, according to Holmstead:
- Double regulation of fuel economy under both the Energy Policy Conservation Act and CAA could adversely affect U.S. auto industry competitiveness.
- Scientific uncertainties and lack of cost-effective technologies make GHG emission standards “inappropriate at this time.”
- Setting GHG motor vehicle standards would “result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the climate change issue.”
Far from being “divorced” from the statutory text, similar policy concerns shaped the text of the statute that the 101st Congress passed and President G.H.W. Bush signed.
Why is this old news important? The extent of EPA’s powers with respect to GHGs is the central issue in the controversy over EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP). Although the CPP would be unlawful on numerous grounds even if Massachusetts spoke the gospel truth, courts with a healthy skepticism about that decision are more likely to review the CPP without fear or favor.
Previous commentary on this blog and elsewhere (here, here, here, and here) examines the Massachusetts Court’s reasoning. The remainder of today’s post summarizes that commentary. [click to continue…]



